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ABSTRACT 
 
The use of experimental economics in valuation of market and non-market goods 
has grown considerably over the past few years. The ability of experimental auctions 
(EAs) to reveal consumer preferences and their malleability have been greatly praised by 
researchers across the profession. Because of the high cost of conducting EAs, 
researchers have a vested interest in extracting as much information as possible from the 
research sample, usually presenting multiple products or product alternatives to 
participants. In the last decade large amounts of work has been done to improve the 
methodology and design of EAs. However, choosing how many products or product 
alternatives to use has no clear guideline. Findings of this study support a “choice 
overload” phenomenon even with a relatively small number of products used for auction. 
Mean willingness to pay was found to be a decreasing function of the number of 
alternatives presented to participants. A heteroscedastic error variance scaler was 
estimated and it was found to be a decreasing function of the number of alternatives 
presented, implying more variance across responses as the number of alternatives 
increases.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Motivation for the Study 
Choice is defined by Merriam-Webster (2014) as the power to make a decision or 
the act of deciding between two or more possibilities. This carries a very potent 
message: power and possibility through decisions. The importance of evaluating choices 
reveals as paramount to economic research. The complexity of a choice task and the 
ability of people to choose play an important role on the validity of the results (Levitt 
and List 2007). Louviere (2006) states: “I am not convinced that…subjects placed in 
strange tasks…tell us much about real behavior”. Cason and Plott (2014) propose that 
the complexity of current experimental valuation techniques produce a “failure of game 
recognition” where subjects do not make the connection between their acts and the 
consequences, rendering choices that are not reflections of preferences. Complexity is an 
issue for subjects, especially those with low mathematical skills, something often 
neglected by economists (Dave et al. 2010). Burton and Rigby (2012) show that almost 
unambiguously, increasing the number and complexity of choices increases the error 
variance in discrete choice experiments (DCE). However, when subjects are permitted to 
self-select the number of options to choose from, they revealed their preferences more 
accurately, considerably reducing the variance in the results. 
The scientific concern about subjects’ behavior when facing many alternatives is 
not new. In the mid-20th century experimental psychology findings by Miller (1944) 
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revealed what he called the double avoidance-attraction conflict. Conflict as defined by 
Miller (1944) is produced when an individual must decide between two competing 
responses that are incompatible and it arises more frequently when a subject has strong 
tendencies towards approaching and avoiding a goal. In one of his studies, subjects who 
were classified as “timid” using psychometric tests were charged with asking for a raise 
in their participation fee for the study. Timid participants had incentives to ask for a 
higher payment, but strong tendencies, due to their personal traits, to avoid the 
confrontation of asking for the raise. The concept developed in the results of this 
experiment is that having to let go of an attractive option or status quo for a potentially 
better alternative, could lead to conflict in individuals and procrastination in the choice 
decision. Lewin (1951) expanded this idea further by proposing that options that are not 
only incompatible but also mutually exclusive lead to more conflict; this situation is 
enhanced as the differences between competing alternatives appears to be smaller. 
Lipowski (1970) proposed that the struggle to decide increases with the number of 
options available, leading to anxiety and failure to choose.  
Contrary to the common assumption that more options are better, the concept of 
choice overload (Iyengar and Lepper 2000), describes that an extensive array of  
alternatives reduces the desire for goods or at least the likelihood of purchase. Iyengar 
and Lepper (2000) conducted a field experiment placing a promotional tasting booth in 
an upscale grocery store, which displayed either 6 different flavors of jam or 24 flavors. 
The flavors of jam that are common in the market (i.e. strawberry, blueberry, etc.) were 
excluded to avoid strong preference for a particular flavor that could influence the 
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results. After subjects approached the booth they tasted as many jams as they wanted to, 
as many times as they wanted to and they were given a coupon towards the purchase of 
any jam of their choosing from the preserves section of the grocery store. Iyengar and 
Lepper (2000) found that subjects presented with 24 different jams were much more 
curious about what was going on than those presented with 6 jams for tasting. Around 
60% of the subjects who walked by the booth with 24 different flavors stopped to taste 
the jams, while only 40% of the shoppers walking by paused when there were only 6 
alternatives. However, from those who stopped at the booths to taste the jams, the ones 
that sampled from the larger number of alternatives were less likely to purchase (3% of 
them did) than those presented with a relatively smaller set (30% bought a jam after 
visiting the booth). This counter-intuitive result that more options of a good decrease the 
probability of purchase is what they define as the choice-overload effect. A possible 
explanation described by the authors (Iyengar and Lepper 2000) is that with simple 
choices, namely limited options, subjects engage in a search for an optimal selection but 
not with larger sets of options. Heiner (1983) suggests that individuals resort to 
simplifying decisions they find complicated, which could be the case if more alternatives 
offered increases the complexity of the decision. 
Most research on choice overload compares large sets of alternatives, i.e. 16-30 
(up to 300) with relatively small ones, i.e. 6-8 (Scheibehenne, Greifeneder, and Todd 
2010). This study evaluates in a non-hypothetical experimental auction (EA) if 
individuals choosing among similar competing products manifest choice overload even 
with few alternatives, reducing the ability of subjects to effectively make market 
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valuations. As EA have become crucial in marketing (Lusk and Shogren 2007a) choice 
overload effects could be problematic if they manifest in small sets of alternatives. Due 
to the cost and time consuming nature of EAs, securing a large sample is always a 
challenge (Lusk et al. 2001). Hence, researchers conducting EAs have a vested interest 
in trying to extract as much information as possible and usually include multiple 
products to be evaluated by participants. In the last couple of decades, research to 
improve the methodology of EA has gained considerable attention (Lusk and Shogren 
2007a, Rousu and Kosa 2005, Corrigan and Rousu 2006, Lusk, Alexander, and Rousu 
2007, Drichoutis, Lazaridis, and Nayga 2008). However, there is no clear guideline on 
how many alternatives should be presented in an EA. Is there a breakpoint where 
confusion overcomes subjects? 
Economists designing EAs are most of the time interested with broader empirical 
and policy questions, such as: What would be the effect of having more alternatives? 
How many alternatives are too many? One of the several aspects to consider is the 
increased search cost associated with a larger set of options. Stivers and Tremblay 
(2005) define search costs as the loss in utility for each additional unit in the set being 
considered. Based on this definition a larger set to choose from increases these search 
costs, thus diminishing utility for all alternatives. There is also another issue to be 
considered with the change in probabilities of finding the “right” alternative. Norwood 
(2006) argues that in a choice situation greater variety increases the probability of 
individuals finding a “new” more preferred option. However, he also points out that if 
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subjects only peruse a subset of options chosen randomly, the probability of finding a 
most preferred option is lower with a larger set than a smaller set. 
Objectives 
This study has as main objective: To answer if having more options in an EA is 
helping or hindering the research agenda of economics?  
The analysis questions can be broken down into two main areas:  
a. About the WTP means:  
i. Does the number of products available in an EA affect WTP values? 
ii. Is WTP a non-increasing function in the number of alternatives?  
iii. Is such function monotonic? 
b. About the variance of the estimates:  
i. Can a relatively small number of alternatives add enough complexity for a 
choice overload effect to manifest in an EA? 
ii. Are subjects able to differentiate products among competing alternatives in 
experimental auctions with increasing number of alternatives?  
iii. Does increasing the number of alternatives hinder respondents’ ability to 
differentiate between products? 
Answers to these questions would help improve the design of EAs, providing 
criteria for tradeoffs between number of products offered, cost of running the EA and 
quality of the data gathered through EAs. Tackling these questions could also shed some 
light on the product offering in more complex settings, such as real markets, where the 
laboratory rigor of experimental economics does not hold.  
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Experimental Methods for Value Elicitation 
The introduction of experimentation to the field of economics has brought with it 
a new era. Louis Wilde (1981) stated that control and accurate measurement were 
objectives of a laboratory experiment in economics. Vernon Smith (1982) described 
experiments as mechanisms to identify patterns of behavior and to motivate more 
explicit theory. By allowing control inside the lab (Davis and Holt 1993b), experiments 
foster the development of understanding of consumer behavior (Unneverh et al. 2010). 
There are many ways to conduct experiments in economics. Experiments must be 
designed to extract information for a particular set of objectives with good experimental 
methods that allow manipulation of variables (Fouraker and Siegel 1963). To design 
experiments that meet these objectives and method criteria, an understanding of the 
theory they are trying to prove or find with them is imperative (Kagel and Roth 1995). 
Value Theory 
Value theory as described by Debreu (1959) and Fishburn (1964) is the theory 
that provides a framework to evaluate exchange of goods and services at a price in a 
given location and time. Under this theory the consumers have a role to choose given 
limitations and choice criterion. The limitations on the selection of consumption obey a 
priori constrains, e.g. physiological or cultural. They also follow value constrains, where 
consumption may not exceed the wealth of the consumer. The set of different points of 
 7 
 
consumption for each consumer given these limitations is the consumption set or total 
demand of each customer. The other component of selection, the choice criterion, is 
expressed as preferences. These expressed preferences (Samuelson 1983) in a 
hypothetical setting where only two goods are available, would be consumption points x 
and y in a plane of all possible consumptions. A function in that plane that passes 
through all the combinations of x and y that would provide the same level of utility is an 
indifference curve (Edgeworth 1881, Pareto 1971). When building a price system P, 
each consumption will have a price in that plane, i.e. Px, Py, for our two good scenario. 
The respective expenditures of a consumer on x and y would be Px*X and Py*Y. For 
each good a function for expenditures in the plane of the price system P can be 
constructed. If the budget constrain is kept unchanged and consumption of y is held 
constant a function passing through all possible levels of consumption for x at different 
prices is known as the demand curve for good X (Marshall 1961). 
Consumer Welfare 
Since the willingness to buy (preferences) cannot be observed (Smith 1982), 
mapping for consumption through demand curves provides a tool for measurement of 
those preferences. Alfred Marshall (1961) used the demand curve to develop the concept 
of consumer welfare. With it he addressed in a two dimensional space how would 
consumers be affected by changes in prices, i.e. how would the welfare increase with a 
lower price and conversely decrease with a higher price. In this analysis, the marginal 
utility of money is assumed to be constant. This means the income effect is neglected: 
individuals value the cost of opportunity of a lower price equally, regardless of how 
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much income they have and how much a price reduction increases their relative wealth. 
Sir John Hicks (1946) took this concept and developed the idea of compensating 
variation, accounting for the effect of different levels of income on the demand and 
therefore on consumer surplus. This theory expresses a gain in consumer surplus in 
terms of how much income the consumer could willingly lose that would not leave him 
better off if the price of a good falls. Hicks (1943) also presented the counterpart of this 
which was the equivalent variation. This addresses the case when the price of a good 
increases. The equivalent variation then measures the gain in income that would make 
the consumer as well off with the increased price of a good. If there is no effect of 
income then these two measures are the same (Willig 1976). 
Differences in WTA-WTP 
The concepts of compensating variation and equivalent variation can used to 
measure preferences. By quantifying how much wealth would an individual be willing to 
let go to obtain a certain good and be as better off than without it, the preferences for 
such product are identified as willingness to pay (WTP). Conversely, when calculating 
how much an individual’s income would have to increase to let go of a good and still be 
as well off, the willingness to accept (WTA) is obtained. Following the logic of 
compensated and estimated variation, without an income effect (with constant marginal 
utility of wealth) there would be no difference between the WTA and WTP. 
There have been studies where a gap has been found (Bateman et al. 1997, 
Knetsch and Sinden 1984, Shogren et al. 2001a). In particular Kahneman, Knetsch, and 
Thaler (1990) observe a difference in favor of the WTA, which they allude it to loss 
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aversion (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) of the good being sold. The idea is that there is 
an endowment effect (Thaler 1980) that apparently is created in experimental settings 
when a subject is given an object. Other studies (Plott and Zeiler 2005, Brown and 
Cohen 2014, Plott and Zeiler 2007, Shogren et al. 1994) have found that when controls 
in experimental design for subject’s misconceptions are implemented, no gap is 
observed. Plott and Zeiler (2005) point an interpretation of their results that there can be 
a demand effect through which the subjects perceive the experimenter wants them to 
remove their ownership values from the valuations. However, there has not been data 
compiled to support or refute this idea. The controls in design suggested to minimize or 
eliminate the gap include incentives to express the true valuations, training and practice. 
Valuation of Preferences 
According to value theory (Fishburn 1964) the consumptions of two goods would 
go by one and only one of the following: a. X is preferred to Y; b. Y is preferred to X; or 
c. X is indifferent to Y. The preferences for sets of goods X1 different from X2 would 
follow the same logic. Total expenditures then for a preferred bundle PxX would be 
higher than or equal to a less preferred bundle PyY (Samuelson 1983, Houthakker 1950, 
Richter 1966). These expenditures are the WTP (WTA) for the bundles and become the 
revealed preferences. When using WTP (or WTA) as revealed preferences for goods, a 
higher value for good X over Y implies preference of X over Y and the opposite for a 
greater WTP for Y over X. If the WTP is the same for both goods, then the individual is 
indifferent between them. WTP (WTA) then becomes the valuation for goods, a tool to 
evaluate consumer preferences, a mean to measure individual inclination in choices. 
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Uses for Value Elicitation 
With valuations regarded as indicators of consumer preferences, its use has 
spread in different fields. Eastaugh (1991) takes value elicitation to measure 
marketability of artificial blood. Hayes et al. (1995) explored food safety concerns and 
preferences among consumers using valuation. Roosen et al. (1998) assess the value 
effect of insecticide residue in apple demand. Diener, O'Brien, and Gafni (1998) perform 
a review of literature on valuation techniques for healthcare providers and conditions. 
Oliver, Mossialos, and Robinson (2004) evaluate the value of technology assessment for 
services in Europe. Lusk and Hudson (2004) provide some points of interest from the 
marketing of agricultural and non-agricultural products perspective on the uses of value 
elicitation. Runge, Converse, and Lyons (2011) use valuation to development of natural 
resource management programs. Given the diverse applications of valuation, several 
different value elicitation methods have been developed. Revealed preference methods 
are the preferred source of value information, when there is a market for a product 
(Cameron et al. 2002). When the good being evaluated either does not have a market yet 
or does not have a market at all, other methods to assign value such as conjoint analysis, 
discrete choice experiments and stated preference are used (Bateman et al. 2002).  
Types of Data 
The technique and approach to value elicitation also depends on the type of data 
to be used. As to which type of data to use, it depends on several factors including 
availability of data and objectives of the analysis. For marketing research the primordial 
sources of data are transaction data, survey data and experimental data (Dickie, Fisher, 
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and Shelby 1987, Wertenbroch and Skiera 2002). The objective with all of these kinds of 
data is the same: trying to find out the “true” WTP from the individuals. Each of these 
kinds of data has different characteristics which are described below. 
Transaction Data 
Using actual market transaction data in research increases transferability 
(external validity) of findings as they represent actual purchases. It is highly accessible 
and provides relatively simple demand revelation (Dickie et al. 1987). However, it is 
only valid for existing products (Cameron and James 1987) and private goods (Cameron 
et al. 2002). It only gives the observed amount of WTP. For the actual buyers, this is not 
the maximum, but only below their threshold. For the non-buyers, this is not a minimum, 
but only above their true WTP (Wertenbroch and Skiera 2002). Also, for products that 
are durable, the market data is very scarce as their buying frequency is very low due to 
their nature (Corsi 2007). 
Survey Data 
Surveys were developed to fill the gap of transaction data (Dickie et al. 1987). 
Originally, they were used alone to do value elicitation, mostly for non-market and 
public goods (Brookshire, Coursey, and Schulze 1987). Nowadays, they are generally 
used as a complement to an experimental procedure (Miller et al. 2011). This is mostly 
due that surveys lack an incentive to state their true preferences (Harrison and Rutström 
2008). This leads to low effort from the subjects and possibly less trustworthy data 
(Gracia, Loureiro, and Nayga 2011). 
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Experimental Data 
Under experimental methods there are experimental choice experiments and 
experimental auctions, both which have several divisions based on their level of 
complexity, type of goods being evaluated, manipulability, number of units and 
procedures (Miller et al. 2011). Experiments have become a weapon of choice in market 
and non-market valuation and their popularity is mainly derived from the fact that these 
non-hypothetical choices reveal values closer to the true preferences than hypothetical 
ones (Chang, Lusk, and Norwood 2009). 
Categorizing Experimental Data 
A wide variety of diverse topics can be addressed with experiments in 
economics. Therefore one way to sort experiments and experimental data arising from 
them can be by their motives, as suggested by Friedman and Sunder (1994). With this in 
mind, experiments can then be sorted as: 1) speaking to the ears of princes; 2) testing for 
empirical regularities; and 3) testing theories, the most pedagogical of all. 
Types of Value in Goods 
As suggested earlier, experimental valuation on goods can be separated into two 
large categories: private and common value in goods. Experiments that seek private 
values assume that each person has a value for the good which is known only to him 
(Paarsch 1992). The experiment then pursues finding this individual private value from 
all participants. The common value setting considers that a good ha the same value for 
all subjects, but that value is unknown to all of them (Kagel and Levin 1986). Subjects 
use private information to assess what that value might be and finding the common value 
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within all these is the objective of the experiment. Most goods would fall somewhere in 
between these categories (Goeree and Offerman 2002), as almost all private goods will 
have some common value component (Corrigan and Rousu 2011). 
Where Experiments Occur 
Another aspect that can divide the experimental design is the location of the 
experiments. While most of the original work in experimental economics took place in 
the laboratory (Smith 1982). In recent years, the interest in field experiments has 
increased (Herberich, Levitt, and List 2009). This could be a result of larger attention in 
the generalization of the results from experiments (Schram 2005). Harrison and List 
(2004) point out, that instead of putting one over the other, laboratory and field 
experiments should be viewed as complements in providing a better understanding of 
human behavior. Nevertheless, the lack of control possibilities in field experiments 
limits studies to be opportunistic, in turn limiting the data and responses that can be 
collected (Levitt and List 2009). 
Experimental Design 
The sufficient conditions of having an environment and an institution to form a 
microeconomic system for experiments as described by Smith (1982) have to be refined 
and adapted to fit experiments that seek to elicit value. Louviere, Hensher, and Swait 
(2000) as cited in Viney, Savage, and Louviere (2005) propose experimental design 
must provide adequate cognitive complexity, identification of the utility factors sought, 
precision of statistical parameters and market realism. Binmore (1999) insists that in 
economic experiments three criteria must be satisfied: 1) Problems posed to subjects are 
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not only “simple”, but presented such that they seem simple to subjects; 2) Adequate 
incentives are provided; 3) Time for learning by trial and error is sufficient. Cason and 
Plott (2014) propose that not accounting for these and other nuisances can lead to a lack 
of game recognition by the subjects, blurring the connection between their actions and 
the consequences. 
Choice Experiments and Conjoint Analysis 
There are several methods available to estimate WTP. Stated preference methods 
and choice experiments are widely used in the environmental literature (Bateman et al. 
2002). They are less frequent in the marketing literature, but contingent valuation 
techniques like dichotomous choice experiments have been applied to food products 
(Ready, Buzby, and Hu 1996, Wertenbroch and Skiera 2002). In a typical experiment of 
this kind, consumers are asked if they would buy a good (yes or no) at a stated price. The 
price is varied between the subjects and the WTP is obtained as the level at which the 
average of subjects would respond “yes” (Hanemann, Loomis, and Kanninen 1991). A 
double-bounded choice question is a variant of the previous, where if the subject 
answers “yes” to the first price proposed, he is then offered a higher price to record his 
response to such. If in turn the subject would not buy the product at the first price, he is 
offered a lower price in a second question and his response for this one is recorded as 
well (Lusk and Hudson 2004). Multiple dichotomous questions follow the same logic 
with more than two consecutive questions of the same kind. The main advantage of the 
approach over the single question setting is a higher statistical efficiency (Hanemann et 
al. 1991). This means that a lower sample size is needed with multiple dichotomous 
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questions than with one single “yes or no” question to achieve a given level of 
estimation precision. The main criticism to multiple dichotomous questions is that the 
answer to the second and subsequent questions depend on the answer to the first, 
therefore a lack of independence in the responses. These may imply that the preferences 
captured are “constructed” (McFadden 1994). If this is the case, the validity of the 
results is diminished. A hindrance to the results from both single and multiple 
dichotomous choice experiments is that the choices are discrete. This implies that the 
WTP distribution parameters in the population must be assumed to correspond to those 
of the sample. Also, these methods assume away the cross-price elasticity effects of 
substitutes and complements by evaluating a single good. 
Conjoint analyses are another tool that can be used for WTP elicitation. In a 
conjoint analysis subjects are asked to choose from different sets. These sets vary in 
different attributes of the products being evaluated and may include price as one of the 
attributes being changed (Louviere 1988). It has been around for over 40 years and it is 
mostly used to infer the buyers’ worth ( referred to as “part-worth” in the literature) for 
attributes at different levels (Green, Krieger, and Wind 2001). It has been one the 
marketer’s favorite tools to evaluate tradeoffs between product characteristics in 
different fields (Chung, Boyer, and Han 2011, Burton and Rigby 2012, Yoo and Doiron 
2013). It allows simulation of a real shopping experience and permits incorporation of 
substitution/complementarity effects. A similar drawback as with dichotomous choice 
experiment is that choices are discrete, complicating the estimation of WTP. Particular 
barriers to the applicability of these methods is that experimental design can be 
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complicated (Kuhfeld, Tobias, and Garratt 1994) and results can be influenced by the 
complexity of the sets being evaluated (Swait and Adamowicz 2001, Burton and Rigby 
2012). A common shortcoming for both dichotomous choice and conjoint analysis is that 
under hypothetical settings there is a lack of incentive compatibility (Carson and Groves 
2007, Collins and Vossler 2009). This produces hypothetical bias: values elicited in 
hypothetical context do not reflect real market situations (List and Gallet 2001, Murphy 
et al. 2005). The main issue with its existence is that subjects overstate their values. If 
there is no cost in expressing a higher valuation, but there is a higher utility to be 
obtained from expressing it, then it is in the subject’s best interest to exaggerate the 
value of his WTA/WTP. Harrison and Rutström (2008) review 34 studies in 
experimental economics literature and find that hypothetical bias can be as much as 
2600%. For market goods, some measures can be taken in experimental design to make 
this kind of experiments incentive compatible. For example, after the completion of all 
trials a random price may be selected as market price and subjects can be asked to act 
upon it according to their previously stated preferences. However, for non-market goods, 
public goods or novel attributes and goods, there is no such option, as not all products in 
the choices are available for subjects to act upon. 
Auction Mechanisms 
The use of auctions in human affairs in history traces back to ancient times. The 
simplest form is where a single unique indivisible object is being sold to one of several 
potential buyers. In recent years auctions have been carried out in laboratory settings as 
experimental auctions (EA) to be used as valuation methods. The objective of such 
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auctions is to try to find the individual home-grown values for the good being auctioned. 
These home-grown values are the subjective private values subjects have for the good, 
not induced by the experimenter (Rutström 1998). EAs have become one of the most 
common methods of valuation (Lusk, Feldkamp, and Schroeder 2004). Their rise in 
popularity is mostly due to the incentive compatibility and the high degree of 
information manipulation that they allow (Lusk and Shogren 2007b). 
Incentive Compatibility of Auction Mechanisms 
When choosing a method of value elicitation incentive compatibility is on the top 
of the list of criteria to consider. A method of value elicitation that is incentive 
compatible as Hurwicz (1973) described it is one that where subjects find it in their best 
interest to reveal their true preferences. Vickrey (1961) explains that in an auction the 
bidder maximizes the probability of obtaining the desired object by bidding his true 
value. In this case, the difference from the bid and his true value, the gain from the 
transaction, would be zero. If the bidder offers a lower price than his true value for the 
good seeking to increase this gain, his chances of obtaining it are decreased. If the bid 
for the item is higher than his true value he increases the possibility of obtaining the item 
but with a negative gain, as the price paid for the item is higher than his value.  
Nevertheless, it must be noted that the incentive compatibility of auctions holds 
only under some assumptions. If the values of each subject vary with the valuation of the 
rivals in the auction, the bids are revised with expectation and visualization of other 
subject’s bids (Rutström 1998). Then values reported may not be the true values for each 
individual. Also, the price to pay under some auction procedures is uncertain, therefore 
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the bids are conditional on the distribution of those potential prices (Horowitz 2006). In 
those cases, bids reveal certainty equivalents, not if the subjects would chose to buy the 
goods at that price. Wertenbroch and Skiera (2002) noted that though theoretically all 
value elicitation methods have incentive compatible features, in the field there may be 
idiosyncrasy generated discrepancies. When asked to state their preferences through 
WTP, subjects may be inclined to overstate or understate their true values following 
what they believe will be done with the information they provide (Carson and Groves 
2007). Bids obtained can be influenced by the experimenter through the framing and 
design of the experiment (Lusk and Fox 2003). 
Types of Auctions 
Auction type mechanisms come in an array of options that can be used. One of 
the most familiar auction mechanisms is the first price increasing auction, better known 
as English auction. There are different variants of this kind of auction. The more 
frequent scenario is where the price begins at a low level and participants offer 
sequential price bids for a particular good. The price continues to increase steadily, by 
means of the auctioneer increasing the price or a timed device, until only one bidder is 
willing to pay for the good at the last offered price. The highest price offered is the 
winner and purchases the product at the last offered price (Rutström 1998). The WTP of 
the winner of an English auction is then known to be at least as high as the last bid 
placed. How much more is undetermined. Kagel and Levin (1986) find that in auctions 
of this kind with limited information about the good and large number of bidders, more 
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aggressive behavior is fostered. This leads to bids over the true value, resulting in losses 
for the winner, known as the winner’s curse. 
The Dutch auction is similar to the English auction. It receives its name from its 
common use in the Dutch flower market since the late 1800’s (Kambil and van Heck 
1998). Instead of starting with a low price and receiving incremental offers, the action 
begins with a prohibitive high price and descends until one of the participants expresses 
his intention to purchase and the good is awarded to that subject at that price (Coppinger, 
Smith, and Titus 1980). In this case the WTP of the buyer is known to be at least as low 
as the price where he expresses interest in the good by bidding. Both the Dutch and 
English auctions carry public availability of price information. All rejected offers in the 
case of the English auction are visible to all participants. All rejected prices in the case 
of the Dutch auction are visible to all participants. Therefore, in both scenarios bidders 
must concern themselves not only with their own value for the good, but with the 
potential value distributions of the competitors. This may increase the transaction costs 
given the substantial effort of information gathering that it would entail (Vickrey 1961). 
The second price sealed bid auction (SPA), also known as Vickrey auction, is a 
modification of the English auction. The first change is that to avoid public bid 
information, all bids are submitted simultaneously as sealed bids instead of publicly 
expressed offers. Bidders cannot modify their bids once they are submitted. The bidder 
must then know at the beginning of the auction the value of the item to himself to place 
his bid. This is analogous to the Dutch auction where the bidder must know beforehand 
where he will decide to act. In English auctions a comparable case happens when book 
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biddings are allowed: a buyer not present can register a maximum bid in advance to 
participate in the auction (Cassady 1967). The second difference is that though the 
winner continues to be the highest bidder, the price to pay will be the second highest bid 
offered (Vickrey 1961). As in the English auction, the winner is the bidder that values 
the item the most (Milgrom and Weber 1982). Unlike the English auction he will not pay 
his value but the second highest bid, a price that allows a gain, therefore providing 
incentives for subjects to bid their true value.  
Another kind of auction used in marketing literature is the Becker, DeGroot and 
Marschak (BDM) method. In a BDM (Becker, DeGroot, and Marschak 1964) subjects 
place their bids for an item and randomly a price is drawn from a previously constructed 
uniform price distribution to be the market price. Subjects who bid the same or higher 
than the randomly selected price purchase the good at that price and become the buyers 
(Becker et al. 1964). The bids are also placed in sealed bids as the SPA. When placing 
the bid, the individual is uncertain as to how much he will have to pay for the item and if 
he will be the winner. These two aspects allow BDM to be incentive compatible. A 
variant mixing SPA and BDM is the nth price auction. In this kind of auctions the bids 
are also submitted as sealed bids. The purchase price is selected randomly from the 
distribution of all offers made. All bidders with offers higher than that nth-price chosen 
randomly become buyers and pay that price (Lusk and Shogren 2007b). The nth-price 
auction also uses private values through sealed bids and has subjects bid independently 
of rival’s valuations, therefore ushering true value bidding from the subjects. 
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Auction Mechanism Considerations 
As to which auction to use for a particular scenario, the answer is not 
straightforward. The theoretical framework of auction theory would indicate that it 
shouldn’t matter  since with all of the different auction mechanisms described previously 
the result yielded would be Pareto-optimal (Vickrey 1961). These results hold under 
symmetric buyer and seller equilibrium (Milgrom and Weber 1982). However, based on 
its efficiency Lusk and Shogren (2007b) suggest that the English auction is second to 
none. The Dutch auction has been known for being fast and low on effort from the 
seller’s perspective (Vickrey 1961). The SPA would follow in terms of efficiency and 
can be characterized as relatively easy to comprehend by the subjects (Lusk and Shogren 
2007b). It has been documented that SPA has a major drawback: overbidding (Kagel, 
Harstad, and Levin 1987). This is understood as bidding above one’s value (Depositario 
et al. 2014). This effect is less when more bidders participate in the auction (Kagel and 
Levin 1993). Another shortcoming of SPA is that for bidders whose values are not close 
to the market price (off-margin), SPA does not capture their preferences (Shogren et al. 
2001b). Conversely, it does capture the preferences of subjects that bid closer to the 
market price (on-margin) better than nth price auctions and BDM (Lusk et al. 2007). 
Shogren et al. (2001b) define these on-margin subjects as the ones bidding in round t 
within $1 of the market clearing price of round t-1. Lusk et al. (2007) also mention that 
these on-margin subjects’ responses are highly related with high value bidding. This 
means SPA will provide more accurate values for high value bidders (Lusk and Shogren 
2007b). SPA are also less likely to foster bidder affiliation than an English auctions 
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(Lusk and Shogren 2007b). As explained by Milgrom and Weber (1982) affiliation of 
bids is the situation where a high bid from one participant, makes higher bids from other 
participants more likely. In their study of bidding behavior List and Shogren (1999) find 
that in SPA treat information as a substitute for posted pricing that could affiliate bids. 
Information perceived as negative could lower the bids and vice versa. 
Number of Rounds 
List and Shogren (1999) showed increasing the number of bidding rounds results 
learning of the methodology but bias of the bids. Bernard (2005) states that repeated 
trials will increase affiliation of the bids, which decreases the potential value of the 
information collected. Lusk and Shogren (2007b) argue is that ordering effects and 
demand reduction can come as a result of fatigue being present in repeated rounds, 
satiation and law of diminishing returns. These results were also found in Corrigan and 
Rousu (2006).  No clear criterion or formal analysis as to where this breakpoint occurs is 
found in the literature. 
Number of Alternatives 
Regarding the number of alternatives to be used in EAs for the bids and the 
number of rounds to be conducted there are no clear guidelines either. The relevance of 
this matter is that in most of economic research, including valuation experiments, 
securing a large sample is a challenge (Lusk et al. 2001). Researchers conducting EAs 
have a vested interest in trying to extract as much information as possible from the small 
sample. Rousu and Kosa (2005) pose that separate bids for multiple products offered in 
the same round of bidding can also serve this purpose, with the caution that the products 
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be substitutes to maximize the amount of usable data. As for the number of alternatives 
in an EA for the same product, the literature does not define a cutoff point. 
Choice and Decision Making 
Choice is defined as the power to make a decision or the act of deciding between 
two or more possibilities (Merriam-Webster 2014). Both definitions carry a very potent 
message: power and possibility in decision. There are several factors affecting choice 
and a plethora of research has been done in trying to measure the impact of diverse 
elements on decision making. Eckel and Grossman (2008), Babcock and Laschever 
(2003) and Arch (1993), among others, study the influence the gender of individuals in 
experiments and how it relates to risk aversion when making decisions, negotiation 
preferences and motivations when choosing. Kanter, Messer, and Kaiser (2009) studied 
the importance of information about other products available to making choices and 
WTP to obtain such information. Eckel and Petrie (2011) study the effect of information 
on the other parties involved in the decision process, WTP to acquire such information. 
Both studies find changes in WTP for a session depending on the order information is 
provided. The value of information is also evaluated by List and Shogren (1999) who 
found that information on price is valuable for novel products as much as having the 
chance to learn other qualities of the products. Drichoutis et al. (2008) found that 
information on price produces higher bids for products in auctions in the laboratory. 
McAdams et al. (2013) found that information about novel products impacts the ranking 
the products and changes the WTP for them. The research of Machina (1992), Slovic 
(1969), and definitely the work of Tversky and Kahneman (1974) pose that the framing 
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and context of the decision is determinant in the outcome of such decision, inviting us to 
consider presentation and information as a highly influential part of the decision process. 
The influence of financial incentives is addressed in the comprehensive compilation 
done by Camerer and Hogarth (1999). It helps point in the right direction in payments in 
experiment design and gives a fairly broad overview of the potential effects of monetary 
incentives in experimental economics. Though their review (Camerer and Hogarth 1999) 
suggests that in most of the cases financial incentives do not show a clear improvement 
on average performance, two cases draw attention: if incentives do impact performance, 
they reduce the variance in the results; and if there is no clear performance standard, 
incentives push individuals away from being socially correct in their responses. Lusk 
and Norwood (2011) found opposite results and point that overbidding is more frequent 
with monetary incentives in SPAs than without them. Depositario et al. (2014) evaluate 
if changing the moment of payment impacts the amount being bid in SPAs, showing that 
indeed it does: more overbidding takes place when there is payment upfront of a 
participation fee. 
Attention is drawn to one dimension of influential aspects in choice that are of 
particular interest to this study: complexity. Depositario et al. (2014) mention that 
overbidding in SPA could respond to bounded rationality: subjects lack the sufficient 
ability or resources, i.e. time, information, etc., to find the optimal utility maximizing 
solution (Simon 1983). If that is the case, then repetition in SPAs should allow learning 
of an optimal strategy and true value bidding. The risks that repetition in SPAs can have 
include the affiliation or bias of the bids (List and Shogren 1999). In particular in 
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economics experiments using food products, repetition could carry the reduced wanting 
for the food as suggested by Morewedge, Huh, and Vosgerau (2010). They found that by 
making subjects imagine repeated consumption of the food, they become satiated and 
therefore less motivated to obtain the food, decreasing their WTP. Another consideration 
is that for repetition to be effective in teaching the subjects, the optimal strategy should 
be conditional on having incentives for learning, such as an out of pocket cost associated 
with not using the optimal strategy (Davis and Holt 1993a). If this were not the case 
there would be “house effects”, i.e. subjects do not really feel it is their money the one 
being used in the EA and therefore are more risk taking and less committed to it in their 
decision making, as described by Thaler and Johnson (1990).  
Along the same lines of bounded rationality in choices, the complexity of the 
task and the subject’s ability to choose also play an important role on the validity of the 
results. Louviere (2006) stated: “I am not convinced that…subjects place in strange 
tasks…tell us much about real behavior”. Heiner (1983) posed that when consumers find 
complex choices they use mechanisms to simplify them into a less complex one. It has 
been noted that complexity is an important issue for subjects, especially the ones with 
low mathematical skills and this problem is often neglected by economists doing 
research (Dave et al. 2010). It was demonstrated by Swait and Adamowicz (2001) that 
complexity of the task indeed changes consumers’ decisions in choice experiments. It 
has also been revealed that techniques to mitigate the hypothetical bias such as cheap 
talk are ineffective when the task complexity is high in choice experiments (Silva et al. 
2012). Burton and Rigby (2012) point out that the almost unambiguous effect in choice 
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experiments of increased complexity is an increase in the error variance, which implies a 
reduction in the consistency of the choices and confounding effects of the treatments. 
Burton and Rigby (2012) found out in their study that if the subjects are allowed to 
select the number of options they wish to choose over, the adequate level of complexity 
for each subject allows them to be able to reveal their preferences correctly or find the 
best option for each one, reducing the variance in the results. The stated motivations for 
subjects choosing a smaller choice set included less confusion; while subjects selecting a 
larger choice set alluded to wanting to find the “right” option. In a separate study 
Arunachalam et al. (2009) also found close to half of the participants would willingly 
change to a smaller choice set, even if that would potentially reduce the chance of 
finding their preferred option. Arunachalam et al. (2009) state that if subjects are not 
sure on the utility to be gained from each good and the cost of finding enough 
information to make the optimal choice is rather large, then smaller choice sets are 
selected. Considering the complexity of a choice situation in terms of the number of 
alternatives, Chung et al. (2011) found that varying the number of alternatives and 
choice sets does impact the marginal WTP in DCEs. This makes reference to the “choice 
overload” concept as described by Iyengar and Lepper (2000), which contrary to the 
common assumption that having more choices is desirable, they found that an extensive 
array of option can reduce the desire for a product. A possible explanation described by 
the authors is that with simple choices, namely limited options, subjects engage in a 
search for an optimal solution. A large amount of options then, complicates the choice 
task and as Heiner (1983) suggested, individuals resort to simplifying the decision 
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possibly by switching their search for optimal choices to a search for satisfactory 
choices. Norwood (2006) proposes that greater variety increases the probability of 
individuals finding a new more preferred option. However, if they only peruse a subset 
of options chosen randomly, the probability of finding such option is lower with a larger 
set than a smaller set. Norwood (2006) states that having a large amount of options to 
choose from decreases the probability of purchasing. This is caused by a lower utility 
from purchasing because of higher search costs. These search costs are defined by 
Stivers and Tremblay (2005) as the loss in utility for each additional unit in the set that is 
being considered. Search costs are particularly important for unfamiliar goods 
(Arunachalam et al. 2009) given the lack of knowledge about the potential benefits of 
new goods. 
Increased complexity in any dimension not only increases the cost of acquiring 
the information, but also raises the cost of processing it. Processing information is the 
other facet of rationality that comes into the equation. If information or familiarity with 
the process or the product is limited, subjects will find themselves looking for cues on 
how they are supposed to behave (Loewenstein 1999). Good sources of these hints are 
the other agents, especially when communication is viable. However, most experiments 
do not allow communication between participants. Therefore, the experimenters 
themselves can be unknowingly and unwillingly guiding the subjects. With limited 
cognitive ability and constraints in time to make decisions, subjects faced with such 
decisions might find the increased complexity overwhelming. Let us take into 
consideration that economic theory dictates different revealed preferences through 
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willingness to pay (WTP) would come from individuals perceiving products as being 
different (Von Neumann and Morgenstern 2007). If consumers do not perceive products 
as dissimilar or if they lack the ability to discern, they would be indifferent between 
alternatives (Debreu 1959, Samuelson 1983). This may be important for any market with 
a large amount of substitutes. The relevance of this to economic experiment design is 
crucial. If the ability of subjects to discriminate between alternatives is affected by the 
number of available alternatives or if the dissimilarities amid products being evaluated 
are not perceived as significant, WTP would not be a true reflection of preferences. An 
increase in the number of alternatives would increase complexity under this model, 
which confuses subjects and confusion makes subjects fail to recognize the connection 
between their actions and consequences.  
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CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY 
 
Experiment Description 
A total of 197 subjects participated in the experiment. Each subject only 
participated in one session. A total of 10 sessions were carried out with a range of 12-28 
participants per session. A compensation of $30 was paid at the end of the session, 
minus any purchases incurred during the experiment. To measure revealed preferences 
an EA was used, namely a second price auction. The second price Vickrey auction 
(Vickrey 1961) was selected due to its incentive compatibility, manipulability and 
efficiency (Lusk and Shogren 2007a) as well as being the predominant method in non-
hypothetical value elicitation mechanisms (Lusk et al. 2004). The auction product was 
one pound of strawberries. The reason to use strawberries is that they are highly 
heterogeneous within each variety, i.e. one pound of the same variety can have an array 
of sizes, color tones, textures and shapes. Another advantage of using strawberries is 
they are commonplace: it is safe to assume participants in the experiment are familiar 
with strawberries. Seven different varieties of strawberries were offered for auction. The 
most popular variety available in local grocery stores was chosen as baseline for 
comparison. All varieties were coded in cyphers of three alphabetic characters to avoid 
ordinal bias (Meilgaard, Civille, and Carr 2007). These cyphers were not related with the 
names of the varieties, so subjects would reveal their preferences on the sample 
presented and not bring their perceptions from the market into the lab. Not all varieties 
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were offered at the same time. The baseline variety was the only strawberry available for 
bidding in all rounds. The only difference between the rounds was the number of 
strawberry alternatives available in the auction. Each round had a different number of 
strawberry varieties available that ranged from one to eight. Each session had a 
randomized order of the bidding rounds. The randomization controls for subject fatigue 
and ordering effects in the auction procedure. The design for the product offering in each 
round is described in Table 1. 
 
 
Table 1: Product offering per round of bidding 
Round Products Offered 
1 Control Base   
2 Control Base Duplicate   
3 Control Base Duplicate Variety 2   
4 Control Base Duplicate Variety 2 Variety 3   
5 Control Base Duplicate Variety 2 Variety 3 Variety 4   
6 Control Base Duplicate Variety 2 Variety 3 Variety 4 Variety 5   
7 Control Base Duplicate Variety 2 Variety 3 Variety 4 Variety 5 Variety 6   
8 Control Base Duplicate Variety 2 Variety 3 Variety 4 Variety 5 Variety 6 Variety 7 
 
 
 
To measure changes in subject´s ability to discern, a duplicate of the baseline 
variety was included in all rounds except for the control round, where only the baseline 
variety and a substitute were presented. This duplicate has a different code than the base 
variety, but was in fact the same. If subjects´ ability to differentiate is unaltered by the 
number of other options presented, the gap (if any) in the WTP between the baseline 
variety and its duplicate should remain the same regardless of how many other varieties 
are offered. In order to avoid deception (Cooper 2014) no information about any of the 
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products was provided. To be able to measure independence of alternatives and 
consistency in decisions a substitute product was included in all rounds of the auction 
along with the baseline strawberry variety. This control product was one pound of 
grapes, which have been regarded as substitutes for strawberries in the literature 
(Henneberry, Piewthongngam, and Qiang 1999, Lin et al. 2009). If independence of 
alternatives holds, the revealed preference for the substitute is independent of the 
number of non-preferred alternatives, i.e. the WTP for grapes should remain unchanged 
by the number of strawberry varieties presented.  
Theoretical Framework 
In its simplest form the expected utility of selecting a product can be expressed 
as the maximum, U*, of a utility function U(X1), where 𝐗𝟏 is the vector of all available 
alternatives for product 𝑿𝟏 = {𝑥: 𝑥11, 𝑥12 … 𝑥1𝑛 ∈ 𝑿𝟏} varying in different attributes and 
attribute levels. This maximization is subject to a budget constrain 𝑷𝑿𝟏𝑿𝟏 ≤ 𝑰, where I 
is the set of resources for the decision, i.e. time, cognitive effort, money, etc. Under such 
model, PX1 represents the relative prices of the resources available for the decision and is 
a function of the monetary cost of the resources themselves. Additionally, the utility 
maximization is also subject to constrains on the use of resources to examine X1 denoted 
by 𝒔 = 𝑓(𝒏) ≤ 𝑺 where n is the number of alternatives of X1. The cost of searching is a 
monotonically non-decreasing function of the size of 𝐗: as 𝒏 increases, so does the 
number of comparisons that need to be performed, increasing the complexity of the 
choice, s, yielding an indirect utility function 𝑽(𝑷𝑿𝟏, 𝑰, 𝑺). Now to take this model 
further consider a two distinct goods case, 𝑼(𝑿𝟏, 𝒀𝟏) where 𝒀𝟏 = {𝑦: 𝑦11 , 𝑦12 … 𝑦1𝑚 ∈
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𝒀𝟏} is a different good from 𝑿𝟏 = {𝑥: 𝑥11, 𝑥12 … 𝑥1𝑛 ∈ 𝑿𝟏}, but still a close substitute 
(there is elasticity of substitution between goods 𝑿𝟏 & 𝒀𝟏), and constrains I, S exist. 
Under these conditions, basic microeconomic intuition suggests that with relative prices 
and resource limitations constant, if the number of alternatives in 𝑿𝟏 increases (n grows 
larger), while the size of 𝒀 is fixed (m is constant), consumers would substitute 𝑥 for 𝑦 
to maximize utility. As the number of alternatives increases, so does the complexity of 
the choices and with it the use of resources to examine the options. The effect on the 
indirect utility 𝑽(𝑷𝒙𝟏, … 𝑷𝒙𝒏, 𝑷𝒀𝟏, 𝑰, 𝑺) would be that the resources (including search 
costs) spent for each good would have to decrease as the number of products increases in 
order to remain in the same level of utility. What this implies in the practical sense is 
that with a higher degree of complexity, decision makers can resort to heuristics such as 
reducing the portion of X being evaluated, search only for lower priced goods, 
inspecting only goods they are familiar with or the ones they have a strong preference 
for, use more time to make their selection, and also the possibility they may not be able 
to reveal their true preferences due to cognitive load resulting from the increased number 
of comparisons the decision carries. 
Let us take into consideration that economic theory dictates different revealed 
preferences through willingness to pay (WTP) would come from individuals perceiving 
products as being different (Von Neumann and Morgenstern 2007). If consumers do not 
perceive products as dissimilar or if they lack the ability to discern, they would be 
indifferent between alternatives (Debreu 1959, Samuelson 1983). This may be important 
for any market with a large amount of substitutes. The relevance of this to economic 
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experiment design is crucial. If the ability of subjects to discriminate between 
alternatives is affected by the number of available alternatives or if the dissimilarities 
amid products being evaluated are not perceived as significant, WTP would not be a true 
reflection of preferences. An increase in the number of alternatives would increase 
complexity under this model, which confuses subjects and as Cason and Plott (2014) 
propose: confusion makes subjects fail to recognize the connection between their actions 
and consequences.  
Econometric Modeling 
In this study the traditional theoretical framework of utility maximization is 
augmented to account for the factors described above. A number of models can be used 
in the analysis of the data from of EAs. The choice of which model to use is mainly 
driven by the data produced in the EA. Data in most EAs is coming from the same 
subject over multiple rounds or it is aggregated for multiple products, providing a panel 
structure for the data. To incorporate this panel structure different models are typically 
used, including linear and non-linear fixed effects regressions (List and Shogren 1999) 
and random effects models (Corrigan and Rousu 2006). Since in EAs the WTP can be 
zero, yielding a distribution censored at zero, a censored approach may be used. For 
these kind of data it is common to use a Tobit (Tobin 1958) model to estimate WTP: 
𝑦∗ = 𝜷𝟎 + 𝜶𝜷 +  𝜀 where 𝑦 = 0 𝑖𝑓 𝑦
∗ ≤ 0 and 𝑦 = 𝑦∗ 𝑖𝑓 𝑦∗ > 0.  
Accounting for Heterogeneity 
In order to account for consumer heterogeneity in responses, a factor (or several) 
can be assumed to have heterogeneous effects on the responses across individuals and a 
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random parameters (RPM) approach  (McAdams et al. 2013) can be used. In the model 
the parameters assumed to be random are allowed to vary with a specified distribution, 
usually a normal or log-normal with a mean 𝐸[𝛽𝑖|𝑧𝑖] = 𝜷 + ∆𝑧𝑖 + Γ𝑣𝑖 , where β is the 
constant means in the distributions, zi is the set of observed variables, Δ is the coefficient 
matrix, vi is the unobservable latent random terms and Γ is the diagonal matrix that 
produces the covariance matrix of the random parameters. The probabilities are based on 
the conditional density 𝑓(𝑦𝑖𝑡|𝑥𝑖𝑡 , 𝛽) = 𝑓(𝛽𝑖
′, 𝑥𝑖𝑡) 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑖 = 1, … 𝑁 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑡 = 1, … 𝑇𝑖 . The 
model assumes then that ∆𝑧𝑖  is the variation in the responses to the parameters across 
individuals (Greene 2012). Therefore, the estimation of the censored data described 
previously is now modified to: 𝑦∗ = 𝜷𝟎 + 𝑿𝜷 + 𝒁∆ +  𝜀. The error term then is the 
reflection of everything else that is not accounted for in the model. 
In the model used in this study 𝑿, 𝒁 are the explanatory variables assumed to 
influence WTP, 𝜷 is the vector of coefficients for those explanatory variables with fixed 
effects, ∆ the vector of coefficients following a distribution (usually a normal) and 𝜀 is 
the error term accounting for unobserved factors influencing WTP. In this general form, 
the model (as well as almost all of the models used for EAs) assumes a normal 
distribution of mean zero and variance σ2 of the error terms (Greene 2012). The other 
assumption about the error term is that it has the same variance across all levels of the 
attributes (𝑥𝑖) being used for evaluation (homoscedasticity). However, if the changes in 
WTP are not only due to the explanatory variables but also an effect of unobserved 
heterogeneous factors across individuals, these unobserved factors can produce 
heteroskedastic error terms (Hess and Rose 2012). 
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Unaccounted Heterogeneity 
If differentiating between alternatives becomes too complex (Swait and 
Adamowicz 2001) or increasingly costly by enlarging the set of alternatives (Stivers and 
Tremblay 2005, Norwood 2006) there could be several consequences on the WTP 
estimates following the theoretical framework of utility maximization described 
previously. First, if the number of alternatives presented is used as an explanatory 
variable in the vector X, it can be determined if it has an effect on the WTP and its 
direction. Second, since search costs and perceived complexity are both unobservable 
processes, the variance of the error term could depend on the number of alternatives. In 
this case, a scale parameter can be used to account for the heteroscedasticity of the error 
variance as a function of the number of alternatives. The Tobit model presented before 
can be modified to include a scaler for the error term: 
(1) 𝑦𝑖
∗ = 𝑿𝜷 + 
𝜀
𝜆
     𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 
(2) 𝜆 = 𝒔 +  𝑢,    𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝒔 = 𝑓(𝑛) 
Where the scale of the error terms (𝜆) is 1 when the errors are assumed to be 
identically distributed across attributes (α) and attribute levels (𝑖) that determine the 
WTP in the usual homoscedastic model. When incorporating heteroscedastic errors the 
scaler is used to adjust the influence of the parameters: 
(3) 𝑦𝑖
∗ = 𝜆𝜶𝜷 +  𝜀 
The scaler captures the influence of unobserved traits on the decision, by 
adjusting the weight of the coefficients (𝛽). The scalers in this study are a function of the 
number of alternatives. If the scaler function is non-decreasing as the number of 
 36 
 
alternatives (n) increases (i.e. 𝜆 has a positive sign) there is a smaller variance: more 
homogeneous effect of unobserved characteristics with each additional product being 
considered. If the scaler function decreases (negative 𝜆) with increases in (n), the 
variance in responses is higher due to the heterogeneous effect of uncontrolled variables 
with each additional unit presented. A higher magnitude of the scaler implies a stronger 
effect of the non-observed features mentioned above (search costs and complexity) in 
the responses. 
Implied Differences 
In order to measure differences across treatments in EAs Lusk et al. (2004) 
propose calculating the implied differences: 𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑖𝑡𝑗 = 𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑖𝑡𝑗 − 𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑖(𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒)𝑗 
where 𝑡 ≠ 𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒. These differences are not censored at zero as subjects can choose to 
increase or decrease their bids in an EA from one round to the next. Thus there is no 
need for a censored approach to measure differences and a random parameter linear 
model can be used (Searle, Casella, and McCulloch 1992). Such a model would have a 
form similar to the RPM Tobit model  𝑦∗ = 𝜷𝟎 + 𝑿𝜷 + 𝒁∆ +  𝜀 where y* are the 
differences specified by 𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑖𝑡𝑗 .  
In this study to model the WTP and the WTP differences the number of 
alternatives, stated consumption behavior and demographic characteristics about the 
subjects were used as explanatory variable. A description of the variables used for the 
evaluation is shown in table 2. 
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Table 2. Random Parameter Tobit Model of WTP for base variety 
Type Variable Description 
Continuous AGE Age of the participant 
Dummy EDUC1* Dummy variable for high school education or no education 
Dummy EDUC2 Dummy variable for some or completed college education 
Dummy EDUC3 Dummy variable for graduate education 
Continuous HHSIZE Household size (number of family members) 
Dummy FEM Dummy variable for being female 
Dummy MARRIED Dummy variable for bein married 
Dummy RACE1 Dummy variable for Hispanic individuals 
Dummy RACE2* Dummy variable for Caucasian individuals 
Dummy RACE3 Dummy variable for Asian, African-American or other races 
Continuous INCOME Annual household income 
Continuous WFV Weekly household expenditures on fruits and vegetables 
Continuous N ALT Number of alternatives available for bidding 
*Used as base levels for the respective dummy variable category. 
 
 
 
Research Hypotheses 
To guide the assessment and discussion of the results, the objectives of this study 
can be evaluated through the following hypotheses:  
1. The number of alternatives available has no effect on the WTP 
2. There is a constant error variance across the number of strawberry alternatives 
presented. 
3. There is no difference in the WTP of the duplicate variety across the number of 
alternatives. 
4. The WTP for the substitute relative to all products does not change with the number 
of alternatives of the products. 
5. The number of alternatives has no effect on the variance of the WTP of the substitute 
with respect to the WTP for baseline variety 
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CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
The sample consisted mostly of females (65%) with an average age of 46 years, 
yearly annual income around $54,000 and expenditures on food of $130 per week. In 
comparison, the study sample is representative of the population according to data from 
the US Census Bureau (2015). The first comparison to be made was the WTP for each 
variety with different number of alternatives.  
 
 
Figure 1: Mean WTP for each variety across different number of alternatives offered 
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Figure 1 shows a graph of the means of the WTP for each variety with different 
number of alternatives. At a glance WTP for varieties 1, 2, 3 seem to decrease with more 
alternatives; varieties 3 and 6 look like they have an increasing trend; and the rest of the 
products appear not to be affected. 
To evaluate the effect of more alternatives on the WTP each variety the mean 
WTP with different number of alternatives were tested with a Kruskal-Wallis. The 
results are shown in Table 3, and they show WTP for varieties 1, 2, 4 and variety 3 are 
statistically different with different number of alternatives, at the 0.05 and 0.1 level 
respectively. The WTP for the baseline variety, the duplicate, the control and varieties 5 
and 6 are not statistically different across the number of alternatives presented. 
 
 
Table 3: Kruskal-Wallis test results for mean WTP for each variety across different 
number of alternatives. 
Variety 
Chi-square 
statistic DF Probability 
V1 12.8080 5 0.0252 
V2 9.2000 4 0.0563 
V3 14.3740 5 0.0134 
V4 17.5650 5 0.0035 
V5 1.5120 5 0.9117 
V6 7.3490 5 0.1959 
Base 9.0090 7 0.2520 
Duplicate 1.5720 6 0.9546 
Control 1.6720 7 0.9758 
 
 
 
To verify if the WTP for each variety is different between each other a different 
Kruskal-Wallis test is conducted on the WTP for the strawberry varieties across different 
number of alternatives offered. The results are described in Table 4. As the results of the 
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test show, the WTP for all strawberry varieties is different between each other across 
different number of alternatives presented.  
However, only one variety was present during all bidding rounds, the baseline 
variety. The comparisons then should be made between this baseline variety and the rest 
of the varieties available to gauge the effect of the number of alternatives on WTP. To 
that end, the WTP of the baseline variety was compared with different number of 
alternatives being presented with a Wilcoxon rank-sum test, described in Table 5. 
 
 
Table 4: Kruskal-Wallis results for WTP for strawberries variety with number of 
alternatives. 
Alternatives 
Chi-square 
statistic DF Probability 
2 4.0680 1 0.0437 
3 44.3050 6 0.0001 
4 52.9110 7 0.0001 
5 50.7460 7 0.0001 
6 43.5570 7 0.0001 
7 59.0350 7 0.0001 
8 63.9060 7 0.0001 
 
 
  
The mean WTP for the baseline variety is statistically equal when 2-8 competing 
alternatives being offered as can be seen in Table 5. The mean WTP for the base variety 
is statistically different from all the other scenarios in the control round, when only the 
baseline variety is presented. So when the baseline variety is presented by itself the WTP 
is higher and statistically different than when the baseline variety is presented with 
competing alternatives.  
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So if the WTP of the baseline variety is statistically equal when 2 or more 
competing alternatives are presented, the following question would be then, is there is an 
effect of number of alternatives being presented, which is the main objective of the 
study. 
 
 
Table 5. Wilcoxon rank-sum test z values for WTP of the baseline variety with different 
number of alternatives presented 
N ALT 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 2.152 2.152 2.671 1.938 1.993 1.871 2.376 
2   0.032 0.648 -0.070 -0.050 -0.121 0.305 
3     0.580 -0.150 -0.040 -0.165 0.304 
4       -0.670 -0.606 -0.689 -0.309 
5         0.069 -0.006 0.408 
6           -0.129 0.287 
7             0.414 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Mean WTP and SE for base variety with different number of alternatives 
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Figure 2 shows a graph of the mean WTP for the baseline variety on the left axis 
and the standard error of the WTP with different number of alternatives (1-8) on the 
right axis. This illustrates better what was shown in Table 5: the mean WTP for the 
baseline variety is higher and different when it is presented by itself than when it is 
presented with competing alternatives. 
With a simple eyeball test, the graph shows a drop in WTP for the baseline 
variety as more alternatives are added until four strawberry alternatives are offered. 
Although the mean WTP in this EA is a non-increasing function of the number of 
alternatives, the pattern it is not always monotonic for all levels, only until four 
alternatives are presented. There is also indication of an increasing variance in the WTP 
in the graph of the standard error as the number of alternatives increases, which leads 
into the next set of research objectives: the effects of the number of alternatives on the 
variance of WTP in EAs. This behavior of the WTP led to explore the possibility of 
structural differences (Wooldridge 2010) in the models across the number of alternatives 
presented.  
A comparison was done between the likelihood ratio of the full model and the 
likelihood of separate models ran for different number of alternatives shown in table 6. It 
was found that there are structural differences in the models when splitting the results by 
number of alternatives presented. Nevertheless, when the results are evaluated in the 
groups 1-4 and 5-8 there are no structural differences from the full model. 
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Table 6. Evaluation models of Log Likelihood Ratio test for structural differences in 
number of alternatives 
Alternatives Log Likelihood Sum LL LRT stat Structurally Different 
1 -274.3625 
-2131.83 12.757 YES 
2-8 -1857.47 
1-2 -542.7014 
-2133.8 8.8232 YES 
3-8 -1591.098 
1-3 -804.1969 
-2135.23 5.9542 YES 
4-8 -1331.037 
1-4 -1070.781 
-2136.39 3.646 NO 
5-8 -1065.607 
1-5 -1343.219 
-2136.38 3.6684 NO 
6-8 -793.1578 
1-6 -1603.341 
-2136.32 3.7916 NO 
7-8 -532.9742 
1-7 -1876.352 
-2135.76 4.8936 NO 
8 -259.4122 
1-8 -2138.211 -2138.21     
 
 
 
Following this logic, the analysis of the data was done evaluating the full model 
and contrasting it with the two separate models for 1-4 and 5-8 alternatives. The 
outcomes of the experiment can be best described by answering the questions that 
motivated it: 
Hypothesis 1: The number of alternatives available has no effect on the WTP 
Can there be choice overload with a small set of alternatives? We evaluate the 
WTP of the baseline variety to test this hypothesis since it was the one strawberry 
variety present in all rounds of the auction. The results for a random parameter Tobit 
estimation of the WTP of the base variety are described in Table 7. A random parameter 
Tobit using the number of alternatives following a normal distribution was used to 
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account for the diversity in cognitive ability, which can be challenged by the complexity 
of the choice with more alternatives being presented, thus yielding a different response 
in each subject. 
 
 
Table 7. Random Parameter Tobit Model of WTP for base variety 
 
Full Model 1-4 Alternatives 5-8 Alternatives 
 
Nonrandom 
parameters 
Marginal 
Effects 
Nonrandom 
parameters 
Marginal 
Effects 
Nonrandom 
parameters 
Marginal 
Effects 
Constant 
2.66355*** 
  
2.82800*** 
  
3.33393*** 
  
(0.08699) (0.1503) (0.15902) 
AGE 
-.01410*** -.01399*** -.01237*** -.01205*** -.02052*** -.02052*** 
(0.00115) (0.00188) (0.00153) 
EDUC2 
.09910* .09833** 0.13596 0.13246 -.18949*** -.18944*** 
(0.05057) (0.08508) (0.06681) 
EDUC3 
0.05655 0.05611 -0.01314 -0.0128 -.20832*** -.20827*** 
(0.05325) (0.09005) (0.07204) 
HHSIZE 
-.03362** -.03336** -.04390* -.04277* -0.00574 -0.00574 
(0.01491) (0.02445) (0.01913) 
FEM 
-.20080*** -.19924*** -.15774*** -.15367*** -.35576*** -.35567*** 
(0.03493) (0.05675) (0.04469) 
MARRIED 
0.01226 0.01217 -0.02398 -0.02336 .08829*** .08826*** 
(0.02232) (0.03689) (0.02815) 
RACE1 
.10235** .10156** .19291*** .18794*** -0.011 -0.011 
(0.044) (0.07311) (0.0582) 
RACE3 
-.27988*** -.27771*** -.30545*** -.29757*** -.32018*** -.32009*** 
(0.04273) (0.071) (0.05876) 
INCOME 
.00527*** .00522*** .00462*** .00450*** .00501*** .00501*** 
(0.00053) (0.00088) (0.00069) 
WFV 
-.06583*** -.06532*** -0.0537 -0.05232 -.15028*** -.15024*** 
(0.02182) (0.03542) (0.02905) 
 
Random 
parameters 
  Random 
parameters 
  
Random 
parameters 
  
N ALT 
-.04218*** -.04186*** -.12835*** -.12504*** -.03942** -.03941** 
(0.00663) (0.02492) (0.01756) 
Std.Dev. 
.72815*** 
  
.75549*** 
  
.53327*** 
  
(0.00708) (0.0133) (0.00885) 
Log-Likelihood -1704.1131 -930.39952 -770.78007 
N Obs 1368 684 684 
 
Note: Significance is indicated by *, ** and *** for the 10%, 5% and the 1% level or 
less respectively. 
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In the model, the number of alternatives offered in each round is included as a 
random parameter assumed to have a normal distribution. The coefficient for this 
variable is non-zero, statistically significant and negative. Therefore, the number of 
alternatives does have an influence on WTP: for each additional alternative offered the 
WTP decreases $0.04 as shown in the second column describing the marginal effects of 
each parameter. When evaluating the model when only 1-4 alternatives are offered the 
significance of the number of alternatives is increased and the WTP decreases $0.12 for 
each additional alternative presented. In contrast, the model of WTP if 5-8 alternatives 
are shown also has a negative and significant effect of the number of alternatives shown, 
but it is smaller than when 1-4 alternatives are presented. What this implies is that in 
experimental design it is a non-trivial task to determine the number of products being 
auctioned. Outside of the laboratory an argument can be made that not only the 
overwhelming set of 24 jams compared to the 6 jam set in the Iyengar and Lepper (2000) 
study can have effects on the intent to purchase in the audience, but a movement within 
the range of 1-8 alternatives can also have an impact on WTP. 
Hypothesis 2: There is a constant error variance across the number of strawberry 
alternatives presented. [This means that in the model  WTPBase
∗ = λ𝐗𝛃 +  ε where 𝜆 is a 
scaler of the variance and it is a function of the number of alternatives,  λ = 1] 
Choice overload was observed in the results of Hypothesis 1: a reduction in the 
WTP as the number of alternatives increases. The next question is if the responses are 
consistent: whether the variance in responses is constant over the number of alternatives. 
Do the unobserved factors increasing complexity and search costs changes as the 
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number of alternatives presented increases? When more unobserved processes impact 
WTP as the array of products increases, this reflects in higher variance of the error term. 
The results of a heteroscedastic Tobit (hTobit) model for the WTP of the baseline variety 
using a scale parameter from a function of the number of alternatives for variance are 
described in Table 8.  
 
 
Table 8. Heteroscedastic Tobit model of WTP of the baseline variety 
 
Full Model 1-4 Alternatives 5-8 Alternatives 
 
Nonrandom 
parameters 
Marginal 
Effects 
Nonrandom 
parameters 
Marginal 
Effects 
Nonrandom 
parameters 
Marginal 
Effects 
Constant 
-3.14854***   -2.57122***   -5.02753***   
(0.13363)   (0.14468)   (0.30055)   
AGE 
0.00046 0.00008 -0.00002 0 0.00127 0.0001 
(0.00058)   (0.00068)   (0.00116)   
EDUC2 
0.02726 0.00454 0.00586 0.00016 0.02868 0.00221 
(0.05607)   (0.06794)   (0.08266)   
EDUC3 
-0.02733 -0.00456 -0.00594 -0.00016 -0.02871 -0.00221 
(0.05608)   (0.06795)   (0.08267)   
HHSIZE 
-0.00048 -0.00008 0.00022 0.000006 -0.00165 -0.00013 
(0.00152)   (0.00182)   (0.00236)   
FEM 
0.00028 0.00004 0.00015 0.000004 0.00042 0.00003 
(0.00081)   (0.00098)   (0.00117)   
MARRIED 
0.00009 -0.00002 -0.00007 0.000002 -0.00013 -0.00001 
(0.00073)   (0.00087)   (0.00104)   
RACE1 
0.08605 0.01435 0.04192 0.00112 0.08027 0.00618 
(0.0792)   (0.09643)   (0.11583)   
RACE3 
-0.08596 -0.01433 -0.04203 -0.00112 -0.07994 -0.00615 
(0.07916)   (0.09639)   (0.11578)   
INCOME 
0.00021 -0.01433 0.00015 0.000004 0.00021 0.00002 
(0.00035)   (0.00044)   (0.00052)   
WFV 
-0.00017 0.00003 -0.00014 0.000004 -0.00012 -0.00001 
(0.00021)   (0.00025)   (0.00032)   
 
Het. Scaler Sigma Het. Scaler Sigma Het. Scaler Sigma 
N ALT 
-.06540*** -.06540*** -.33640*** 8.30988*** .11939*** 1.82134*** 
(0.00703) (0.00703) (0.0277) (0.90598) (0.01403) (0.15422) 
Log-L -6188.22486 -2942.61565 -3529.43926 
N Obs 1576 788 788 
 
Note: Significance is indicated by *, ** and *** for the 10%, 5% and the 1% level or 
less respectively. 
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The hTobit accounts for unobserved differences in the conditional variance of the 
WTP estimates but not the effect on the WTP means themselves. In the results only the 
heteroscedasticity scaler and the intercept of the regression are statistically different than 
zero. For the full model and the one where 1-4 alternatives are shown the variance scaler 
is negative. This implies that the variance in the responses is not only dependent on the 
number of alternatives presented, but that it increases as the size of the array of options 
increases. With a limited allowance of resources such as time and cognitive ability, 
individuals making purchasing decisions have to push themselves to maximize these 
resources. This pressure to achieve a result can lead to confusion and a suboptimal 
performance (Ariely et al. 2009, Cherry et al. 2004). With suboptimal decision making 
with a larger number of alternatives to choose from, what the model shows is that the 
revealed preferences are not clean cut: no single factor can be traced to have an effect on 
the WTP for the base variety when accounting for heteroskedastic variance. 
The model when 5-8 alternatives are presented on the other hand has a positive 
variance scaler as a function of the number of alternatives. This implies that the variance 
in WTP decreases as more alternatives are shown: the decision making process when 5-8 
alternatives are offered becomes less heterogeneous. Subjects may be simplifying their 
decision making process past the four alternatives threshold and using heuristics that 
allow more efficient decision making. Nevertheless, the results of the EA when 1-4 
alternatives are presented are different from the ones when 5-8 alternatives are offered. 
Therefore, as EAs and other experimental techniques have become stalemates in 
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research, conclusions drawn from them could be tarnished by the confounding effect of 
having too many options to evaluate. 
Hypothesis 3: There is no difference in the WTP of the duplicate variety across the 
number of alternatives. [In the utility model  𝐔(𝐗𝐢 , 𝐗𝐣), 𝐕(𝐏𝐢, 𝐏𝐣, 𝐈, 𝐒) if xi
(1)
= xi
(2)
∈
𝐗𝐢 it implies that pi
(1)
= pi
(2)
∈ 𝐏𝐢; Then if the size of  𝐗𝐢 increases,  pi
(1)
= pi
(2)
∈
𝐏𝐢 should still hold. If this is true the WTP for two identical products is unaffected by the 
number of alternatives presented. So, if the number of alternatives does not impact the 
ability to differentiate between products, the gap (if any) between the WTP of two 
identical products should be the same across all different number of alternatives 
presented]. 
Is the ability of subjects to tell differences between products impacted by the 
number of products they have to evaluate? The ability of subjects to tell differences 
between products is crucial for all valuations gathered through EA. Since resources to 
evaluate a decision, such as time to decide and discerning ability are limited, increasing 
the size of the array to evaluate could have an effect on the capability to tell differences 
between goods. This effect can be captured by measuring the difference between the 
WTP of the baseline variety and its duplicate: Δ𝑊𝑇𝑃 =  𝑊𝑇𝑃𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒 − 𝑊𝑇𝑃𝐷𝑢𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑒. 
These implied differences between the base variety and the duplicate can be either 
positive or negative, as subjects in the EA can choose to increase or decrease their bids 
for the products offered. This eliminates the need of a censored approach. A random 
parameter linear regression using the number of alternatives as random parameter is 
described in Table 9. 
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Table 9. Random Parameter Linear Model of WTP differences between base variety and 
its duplicate 
 
Full Model 1-4 Alternatives 5-8 Alternatives 
 
Nonrandom 
parameters 
Nonrandom 
parameters 
Nonrandom 
parameters 
AGE 
-.00437*** -.00380* -0.00165 
(0.00114) (0.00197) (0.00159) 
EDUC2 
-0.0702 -0.07096 0.08087 
(0.04731) (0.08597) (0.06722) 
EDUC3 
-.12880** -0.10796 -0.00535 
(0.05006) (0.09032) (0.07106) 
HHSIZE 
-0.00636 -0.00871 0.00891 
(0.01583) (0.02783) (0.0209) 
FEM 
-.06597* -0.04662 -0.02449 
(0.03479) (0.06013) (0.04761) 
MARRIED 
.04252* 0.0258 .07234** 
(0.0233) (0.03881) (0.03082) 
RACE1 
-0.06849 -0.04684 -0.05333 
(0.0466) (0.08087) (0.0601) 
RACE3 
0.06365 0.09879 0.08118 
(0.04861) (0.08416) (0.06559) 
INCOME 
.00101* .00157* -0.00019 
(0.00052) (0.00087) (0.00074) 
WFV 
0.01433 0.04757 -0.01446 
(0.02358) (0.04029) (0.03081) 
 
Random 
parameters 
Random 
parameters 
Random 
parameters 
NALT 
0.00346 -0.04019 -.03443** 
(0.00831) (0.02975) (0.01462) 
Std.Dev. 
.60323*** .62078*** .55465*** 
(0.00556) (0.01155) (0.00793) 
Log-Likelihood -1171.29105 -539.00169 -633.91417 
N Obs 1197 513 684 
 
Note: Significance is indicated by *, ** and *** for 
the 10%, 5% and the 1% level or less. 
 
 
This estimation yields two interesting results. First, subjects seem to find 
differences where technically there aren’t any. There should not be any gap between the 
WTP for the baseline variety and its duplicate since they are identical; nevertheless, the 
number of available alternatives affects WTP. The second result is that as the number of 
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alternatives increases the gap between the WTP of the base variety and its duplicate 
decreases. This entails that subjects that once perceived two goods as being different, no 
longer consider them distinct when they have more items to choose from. The number of 
alternatives in the model of 5-8 alternatives is statistically significant and the variance of 
the parameter is lower than the model with 1-4 alternatives. A possible explanation is 
that the ability to discern of an individual is limited, so if other resources such as time 
and required effort to perform an evaluation are constrained, it would imply that a 
smaller portion of the resources will be dedicated to each comparison as the set to peruse 
from grows larger. With fewer resources devoted to make comparisons, less attributes of 
the products may be used for the evaluation, a subset of the array may be selected to 
evaluate or any other heuristic can be used to maximize the use of resources. In any case, 
the evaluation process of a small array is different than the process to make such 
evaluation when the size of the array grows larger. 
Hypothesis 4: The WTP for the substitute relative to all products does not change with 
the number of alternatives of the products. [If the number of elements in  𝐗n in the utility 
model  𝐔(𝐗𝐧 , 𝐘𝐦) increases, then following the indirect utility 𝐕(𝐏𝐢…𝐧, 𝐏𝐣, 𝐈, 𝐒) the 
relative price 𝐏𝐣 will increase. Therefore, in a regression of ΔWTP = WTPBase −
 WTPSubstitute having a statistically significant coefficient for the number of alternatives 
implies the WTP gap changes as such number increases, i.e. the substitute produce 
becomes relatively more attractive]. 
If the preference for a substitute and the preference for a product are independent 
of which alternatives are presented, the gap between the WTP of the substitute and the 
 51 
 
base variety should remain the same with different number of alternatives of the 
strawberries. To measure this relationship a random parameter linear regression of the 
WTP differences between the baseline strawberry variety and the substitute grapes is 
estimated. As was shown in the results under hypothesis 1, the WTP of the baseline 
strawberry variety decreased as the number of alternatives increased (up to four 
alternatives). The mean WTP for the control product (grapes) was not statistically 
different from one round to the next as shown in Table 10.  
 
 
Table 10. Wilcoxon rank-sum z values z values for WTP of the grapes with different 
number of strawberries alternatives presented 
N ALT 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 0.329 0.690 0.556 0.578 1.097 0.509 0.959 
2   0.395 0.219 0.259 0.770 0.183 0.637 
3     -0.164 -0.134 0.393 -0.194 0.262 
4       0.023 0.560 -0.033 0.427 
5         0.522 -0.056 0.404 
6           -0.571 -0.115 
7             0.461 
 
 
 
Since the differences can go either way, positive or negative from one round to 
the next, a random parameter linear approach is convenient and no censoring is needed. 
To account for the potential effects across individuals of the increase in the number of 
alternatives, the number of alternatives presented is used as a random coefficient in the 
regression. The results for such a model are described in Table 11. The number of 
alternatives as a parameter of the regression is statistically significant and negative when 
1-4 alternatives are presented. This implies that increasing the number of alternatives 
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reduces the gap between the WTP for the baseline variety and the substitute when 1-4 
alternatives are presented. 
 
 
Table 11. RPM Linear regression of WTP differences between the baseline variety and 
the grapes 
 
Full Model 1-4 Alternatives 5-8 Alternatives 
 
Nonrandom 
parameters 
Nonrandom 
parameters 
Nonrandom 
parameters 
AGE 
-.00380*** -0.00236 -.00592*** 
(0.00098) (0.00161) (0.00153) 
EDUC2 
.42108*** .49030*** .31207*** 
(0.03933) (0.06343) (0.06561) 
EDUC3 
.18864*** .22142*** .19340*** 
(0.04272) (0.069) (0.07108) 
HHSIZE 
0.01872 0.01408 .05920*** 
(0.01445) (0.02335) (0.02085) 
FEM 
.06548** .14790*** -0.00016 
(0.02971) (0.04817) (0.04564) 
MARRIED 
-0.01238 -0.03018 .09241*** 
(0.01918) (0.03148) (0.02874) 
RACE1 
0.05625 0.10389 0.05463 
(0.04026) (0.06424) (0.06057) 
RACE3 
.19301*** .19528*** .11927* 
(0.04101) (0.06424) (0.06197) 
INCOME 
.00223*** .00154* 0.00108 
(0.00051) (0.00084) (0.00074) 
WFV 
-0.0322 -0.01533 -.08004*** 
(0.02191) (0.03416) (0.03092) 
 
Random 
parameters 
Random 
parameters 
Random 
parameters 
NALT 
-0.00563 -.06343*** 0.00377 
(0.00672) (0.02253) (0.01457) 
Std.Dev. 
.69965*** .71507*** .58334*** 
(0.00727) (0.01286) (0.00964) 
Log-Likelihood -1626.07344 -868.07237 -793.17734 
N Obs 1368 684 684 
 
Note: Significance is indicated by *, ** and *** for 
the 10%, 5% and the 1% level or less. 
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Then with a decreasing WTP for the baseline variety and a relatively constant 
WTP for grapes, there is a substitution effect happening between the baseline variety of 
strawberries and the grapes. In contrast, when 5-8 alternatives are presented, the effect of 
the number of alternatives on the difference between the WTP of the baseline variety 
and the substitute is not statistically different. Once the boundary of four alternatives is 
crossed, the mean and the variance of WTP of both the baseline variety and the 
substitute are not statistically different across number of alternatives, thus no effect on 
the differences between them. The implication is that as the cost of evaluating more 
alternatives of the strawberries increases, the grape substitute whose search costs are 
constant becomes more attractive and a portion of the market indeed makes the switch 
and selects the substitute product.  
Hypothesis 5: The number of alternatives has no effect on the variance of the WTP of 
the substitute with respect to the WTP for baseline variety. [Therefore, in the 
model ΔWTP = λ𝐗𝛃 +  ε where ΔWTP = WTPBase − WTPSubstitute and 𝜆 is a scaler of 
the variance from a function of the number of alternatives, λ = 1. Then if the scale 
parameter in the model is not equal to 1 the variance in the differences in WTP changes, 
depending on the sign, as the number of alternatives increases]. 
As shown under hypothesis 5, the gap between the WTP of the substitute and the 
WTP for base variety decreases as the number of alternatives increases. The array size 
may also have an unobserved effect on the WTP gap, impacting the error term with each 
level. The output of a heteroscedastic linear regression using a scaler parameter as a 
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function of number of alternatives is in Table 12. Once again, the implied differences 
don’t have bounds, so there is no need for a censored approach. 
 
 
Table 12. Heteroscedastic Linear Regression of WTP differences between baseline 
variety and the grapes substitute 
 
Full Model 1-4 Alternatives 5-8 Alternatives 
 
Nonrandom 
parameters 
Nonrandom 
parameters 
Nonrandom 
parameters 
AGE 
-1.92506*** -2.11967*** -2.15131*** 
(0.07993) (0.08299) (0.08346) 
EDUC2 
-154.883*** -170.543*** -173.095*** 
(9.74437) (10.11744) (10.175) 
EDUC3 
155.725*** 171.471*** 174.036*** 
(9.74347) (10.11651) (10.17406) 
HHSIZE 
0.21582 0.23752 0.24095 
(0.24764) (0.25713) (0.25859) 
FEM 
0.22013 .24241* .24599* 
(0.13604) (0.14124) (0.14205) 
MARRIED 
.60249*** .66351*** .67348*** 
(0.12392) (0.12867) (0.1294) 
RACE1 
1.73459 1.9141 1.94688 
(13.99005) (14.52567) (14.60831) 
RACE3 
-0.89316 -0.98767 -1.00655 
(13.98448) (14.51988) (14.60249) 
INCOME 
-.63384*** -.69786*** -.70831*** 
(0.05803) (0.06025) (0.0606) 
WFV 
.67141*** .73931*** .75038*** 
(0.03803) (0.03948) (0.03971) 
 
Random 
parameters 
Random 
parameters 
Random 
parameters 
Scaler 
.04134*** -.00025*** -.00011*** 
(0.00729) (0.00003) (0.00003) 
Sigma 
732.950*** 782.668*** 841.113*** 
(15.60386) (10.50813) (7.68559) 
Log-Likelihood -70460.15938 -70800.8925 -70824.30825 
N Obs 1576 788 788 
 
Note: Significance is indicated by *, ** and *** for the 
10%, 5% and the 1% level or less respectively 
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With a positive and significant effect, the scale parameter in the full model shows 
that as the number of alternatives increases, the variance of the gap between the WTP of 
the baseline variety and the substitute is reduced. As the number of alternatives 
increases, the unobserved factors account for less of the variability of the differences 
between the WTP of the baseline variety and the substitute. In contrast, when the results 
are split into models for 1-4 alternatives and 5-8 alternatives, the scale parameter as a 
function of number of alternatives is negative and significant. This implies that the 
variance in the differences between WTP of the baseline variety and the substitute within 
each group increases with the number of alternatives presented within each group. 
Therefore, the unobserved and unaccounted effects of having more alternatives to 
choose from are increasing the variance in the differences in WTP. 
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CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
Summary and Conclusions 
As the markets for different products grow, so do the number of alternatives 
presented to consumers in those markets. In an effort to develop new products and 
marketing strategies, experimental economics and the laboratory have proved 
tremendously useful. In particular, the use of experimental auctions has become 
widespread in the marketing and economics literature. Though great lengths have been 
taken to improve the methodology of EA, the number of products or product alternatives 
being auctioned on does not have a clear guideline. The intrinsic assumption is that the 
ability of subjects to evaluate the products is unaffected by the number of alternatives 
available. If this is not the case, this can be a hazard to the results gathered through EAs. 
The results of this study showed that changing the number of alternatives in EA 
can have non-trivial effects on the WTP gathered from subjects. Furthermore, there is an 
unequivocal increase in the variance of responses with an increase in the size of the array 
of options to choose from. This noise, these unobserved effects, are confounding the 
results of WTP estimates, providing results that are not true reflections of preferences. 
The results are more than a cautionary note on experimental design regarding number of 
alternatives. When conducting valuation experiments the cognitive effort demanded 
from subjects is not negligible and increasing the number of alternatives to choose from 
exerts even more stress. In the field, the cognitive ability of subjects dedicated to 
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evaluate differences between products remains limited, but time is not always 
constrained, contrary to most laboratory settings. If time is not under constrains, then 
more effort can be devoted to each comparison. However, other resources that are also 
part of the discerning process can be limited and lead to results similar to the ones found 
in this study. 
So, having more products to choose from in EAs is fostering or hindering the 
research agenda of economics? From the results of this study, the answer would be the 
latter. The preference revealing features of the second price auction seem to succumb to 
the lack of recognition of the objective from the participants. The preferred method of 
non-hypothetical valuation is not immune to a cognitive load effect on subjects. As the 
number of different alternatives provided increases so does the complexity of the choice, 
forcing subjects to maximize their resources, sometimes beyond their own abilities to 
discern between products. Extensive research is still needed in this area with other 
valuation techniques and different products, but so far it seems that at least for subjects 
in EAs, more is not always better.  
Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research 
The main limitation to this study is that it was conducted in a laboratory setting, 
with the subtle and sometimes not so subtle experimenter effects that can accompany 
any laboratory experiment with human subjects. A logical extension would be 
conducting field experiments on whether actual purchasing of goods is affected by a 
relatively small change in the number of alternatives in the same way as it is in the lab.  
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Interesting candidates to be evaluated for choice overload effects would be 
products that have a high heterogeneity associated with each alternative, like 
strawberries used in this study. This would allow for a higher number of comparisons to 
be made on many different levels. That is another observation to this study: the products 
used are highly heterogeneous within each category used for evaluation. The results may 
not hold for products with very consistent differences across alternatives.  
A field experiment with a similar setting could prove interesting for different 
areas given that for example in 1997 the amount of fresh produce items carried in the 
average grocery store were 345 and by 2008 the number of available products in the fruit 
and vegetable sections in grocery stores had increased to 2,200 (FMI 2015); this increase 
took place while the consumption of fruits and vegetables per capita has decreased from 
311 to 180 pounds per year in the same period of time (ERS 2011). 
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APPENDIX C 
 
STATA CODE 
*--------------------------------------------------------- 
*DO FILE TO ANALYZE INFORMATION FROM STRAWBERRIES AUCTION 
*--------------------------------------------------------- 
 
*Legend 
 
*rv = round.variety 
*Rounds 
* =1 Baseline 
*   =2 Two strawberries 
*   =3 Three strawberries 
*   =4 Four strawberries 
* =5 Five strawberries 
*   =6 Six strawberries 
*   =7 Seven strawberries 
*   =8 Eight strawberries 
 
* Varieties 
*    =1 Albion ABN 
*    =2 Festival FST 
*    =3 Benicia BNC 
*    =4 San Andres SCP 
*    =5 Chandler DHC 
*    =6 Camarosa CMR 
*    =7 Driscoll's SLD 
*    =8 Driscoll's CDS 
*    =9 Grapes 
 
*--------------------------------------------------------- 
* BEGINNING DO FILE 
*--------------------------------------------------------- 
 
clear 
cd "C:\Users\dchavez\Documents\Dropbox\1 TAMU\RA\Thesis\Strawberry.Data" 
log using berries_data, replace 
 
use berries_data 
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*Reshape data for wtp 
reshape long wtp, i(id) j(rv) 
keep if wtp<. 
 
*Reshape data for ratings 
reshape long ovrp, i(id) j(rv) 
keep if ovrp<. 
 
*---------------------------------------------------------- 
*GENERATED VARIABLES 
*---------------------------------------------------------- 
*Generate indicators for strawberry varieties 
use berries_data_rv 
gen V1:.= rv==11|rv==21|rv==31|rv==41|rv==51|rv==61|rv==71|rv==81 
gen V2:.= rv==12|rv==22|rv==32|rv==42|rv==52|rv==62|rv==72|rv==82 
replace V2 = 2 if V2==1 
gen V3:.= rv==13|rv==23|rv==33|rv==43|rv==53|rv==63|rv==73|rv==83 
replace V3 = 3 if V3==1 
gen V4:.= rv==14|rv==24|rv==34|rv==44|rv==54|rv==64|rv==74|rv==84 
replace V4 = 4 if V4==1 
gen V5:.= rv==15|rv==25|rv==35|rv==45|rv==55|rv==65|rv==75|rv==85 
replace V5 = 5 if V5==1 
gen V6:.= rv==16|rv==26|rv==36|rv==46|rv==56|rv==66|rv==76|rv==86 
replace V6 = 6 if V6==1 
gen V7:.= rv==17|rv==27|rv==37|rv==47|rv==57|rv==67|rv==77|rv==87 
replace V7 = 7 if V7==1 
gen V8:.= rv==18|rv==28|rv==38|rv==48|rv==58|rv==68|rv==78|rv==88 
replace V8 = 8 if V8==1 
gen V9:.= rv==19|rv==29|rv==39|rv==49|rv==59|rv==69|rv==79|rv==89 
replace V9 = 9 if V9==1 
egen var = rowtotal(V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 V7 V8 V9) 
gen V7_1:.= rv==27|rv==37|rv==47|rv==57|rv==67|rv==77|rv==87 
replace V7_1 = 7 if V7_1==1 
gen VD:.= 
rv==27|rv==37|rv==47|rv==57|rv==67|rv==77|rv==87|rv==28|rv==38|rv==48|rv==58|rv
==68|rv==88|rv==88 
replace VD = 8 if V8==8 
replace VD = 7 if V7_1==7 
generate dup = VD>0 
 
*Generate indicators for rounds and variety per round 
gen R1:. = (10<rv) & (rv<20) 
gen R2:. = (20<rv) & (rv<30) 
replace R2 = 2 if R2==1 
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gen R3:. = (30<rv) & (rv<40) 
replace R3 = 3 if R3==1 
gen R4:. = (40<rv) & (rv<50) 
replace R4 = 4 if R4==1 
gen R5:. = (50<rv) & (rv<60) 
replace R5 = 5 if R5==1 
gen R6:. = (60<rv) & (rv<70) 
replace R6 = 6 if R6==1 
gen R7:. = (70<rv) & (rv<80) 
replace R7 = 7 if R7==1 
gen R8:. = (80<rv) & (rv<90) 
replace R8 = 8 if R8==1 
egen round = rowtotal(R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8) 
 
*Generate indicators for sessions 
gen S1:.= (100<id) & (id<200) 
gen S2:.= (200<id) & (id<300) 
gen S3:.= (300<id) & (id<400) 
gen S4:.= (400<id) & (id<500) 
gen S5:.= (500<id) & (id<600) 
gen S6:.= (600<id) & (id<700) 
gen S7:.= (700<id) & (id<800) 
gen S8:.= (800<id) & (id<900) 
gen S9:.= (900<id) & (id<1000) 
gen S10:.= (1000<id) & (id<1100) 
 
*Clone wtp for means test 
clonevar wtpv1 = wtp if var==1 
clonevar wtpv2 = wtp if var==2 
clonevar wtpv3 = wtp if var==3 
clonevar wtpv4 = wtp if var==4 
clonevar wtpv5 = wtp if var==5 
clonevar wtpv6 = wtp if var==6 
clonevar wtpv7 = wtp if var==7 
clonevar wtpv8 = wtp if var==8 
clonevar wtpv9 = wtp if var==9 
clonevar wtpv7_1 = wtp if V7_1==7 
egen wtp_b = rowmean(wtpv1 wtpv2 wtpv3 wtpv4 wtpv5 wtpv6 wtpv7 wtpv8) 
egen wtp_d = rowmean(wtpv7_1 wtpv8) 
 
*Clone ratings for means test 
clonevar ovrpv1 = ovrp if V1==1 
clonevar ovrpv2 = ovrp if V2==1 
clonevar ovrpv3 = ovrp if V3==1 
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clonevar ovrpv4 = ovrp if V4==1 
clonevar ovrpv5 = ovrp if V5==1 
clonevar ovrpv6 = ovrp if V6==1 
clonevar ovrpv7 = ovrp if V7==1 
clonevar ovrpv8 = ovrp if V8==1 
clonevar ovrpv9 = ovrp if V9==1 
 
*Generate variables for treatments 
gen AM:.= (S5==1)|(S6==1)|(S7==1)|(S8==1) 
gen AFF:.= (S2==1)|(S4==1)|(S6==1)|(S8==1)|(S10==1) 
gen Eval:.= (S1==1)|(S2==1)|(S5==1)|(S8==1)|(S9==1)|(S10==1)  
 
use "C:\Users\dchavez\Dropbox\1 
TAMU\RA\Thesis\Strawberry.Data\analysis\Berries_data_rv 2.dta"  
 
set more off 
 
/*recode wfood 1-8 for actual values*/ 
recode wfood (1=24.5) (2=74.5) (3=124.5) (4=174.5) (5=224.5) (6=274.5) (7=349.5) 
(8=400) 
 
/*recode educ 1-4 1=no school; 2=hs; 3=college; 4=grad*/ 
recode educ (2=1) (3=2) (4=3)  
tabulate educ, generate(educ) 
 
/*recode race 1-5; 1=hisp, 2=white, 3=black, 4=asian, 5=other */ 
recode race (4=3) (5=3)   
tabulate race, generate(race) 
 
/*recode income 1-8; 1=<20k, 2=20-29, 3=30-39, 4=40-49, 5=50-59, 6=60-69, 7=70-79,  
8=80-89, 9=90-99, 10=100-150, 11=150*/ 
recode income (1=9.5) (2=24.5) (3=34.5) (4=44.5) (5=54.5) (6=64.5) (7=74.5) (8=84.5) 
(9=94.5) (10=124.5) (11=150) 
 
/* make aff from 0-1 instead of 0-100*/ 
generate naff=aff/100 
 
/* rename panel to panelid*/ 
rename panel panelid 
 
/* rename AFF - uppercase for whether they received affinity treatment*/ 
rename AFF afft 
 
/* corecting for coding*/ 
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replace V1=0 
replace V1=1 if rv==11 | rv==21 | rv==31 | rv==41 | rv==51 | rv ==61 | rv==71 | rv==81 
 
/*create delta variables of differences in duplicate variable*/ 
by id round, sort : egen float ddupl = total((wtp*V7)-(wtp*V8)) if round!=1 
replace ddupl=. if V7!=1 
by id round, sort : gen float ddup14 = ddupl if round>=1 & round<=4 
by id round, sort : gen float ddup58 = ddupl if round>=5 
 
/*create delta variables of differences in duplicate variable*/ 
by id round, sort : egen float dctrl = total((wtp*V7)-(wtp*V9)) if V9==1|V7==1 
replace dctrl=. if V9==1 
by id round, sort : gen float dctr14 = dctrl if round>=1 & round<=4 
by id round, sort : gen float dctr58 = dctrl if round>=5 
 
/*create round variables for split analysis*/ 
by id round, sort : gen float alt14 = round if round>=1 & round<=4 
by id round, sort : gen float alt58 = round if round>=5 
 
/*create WTPV7 variables for breakpoint analysis*/ 
by id round, sort : gen float wtpv711 = wtpv7 if round==1 
by id round, sort : gen float wtpv728 = wtpv7 if round>1 
 
by id round, sort : gen float wtpv712 = wtpv7 if round<=2 
by id round, sort : gen float wtpv738 = wtpv7 if round>2 
 
by id round, sort : gen float wtpv713 = wtpv7 if round<=3 
by id round, sort : gen float wtpv748 = wtpv7 if round>3 
 
by id round, sort : gen float wtpv714 = wtpv7 if round<=4 
by id round, sort : gen float wtpv758 = wtpv7 if round>4 
 
by id round, sort : gen float wtpv715 = wtpv7 if round<=5 
by id round, sort : gen float wtpv768 = wtpv7 if round>5 
 
by id round, sort : gen float wtpv716 = wtpv7 if round<=6 
by id round, sort : gen float wtpv778 = wtpv7 if round>6 
 
by id round, sort : gen float wtpv717 = wtpv7 if round<=7 
by id round, sort : gen float wtpv788 = wtpv7 if round>7 
 
*Means of control over #alternatives* 
ranksum wtpv9 if round==1|round==2, by(round) porder 
ranksum wtpv9 if round==1|round==3, by(round) porder 
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ranksum wtpv9 if round==1|round==4, by(round) porder 
ranksum wtpv9 if round==1|round==5, by(round) porder 
ranksum wtpv9 if round==1|round==6, by(round) porder 
ranksum wtpv9 if round==1|round==7, by(round) porder 
ranksum wtpv9 if round==1|round==8, by(round) porder 
 
ranksum wtpv9 if round==2|round==3, by(round) porder 
ranksum wtpv9 if round==2|round==4, by(round) porder 
ranksum wtpv9 if round==2|round==5, by(round) porder 
ranksum wtpv9 if round==2|round==6, by(round) porder 
ranksum wtpv9 if round==2|round==7, by(round) porder 
ranksum wtpv9 if round==2|round==8, by(round) porder 
 
ranksum wtpv9 if round==3|round==4, by(round) porder 
ranksum wtpv9 if round==3|round==5, by(round) porder 
ranksum wtpv9 if round==3|round==6, by(round) porder 
ranksum wtpv9 if round==3|round==7, by(round) porder 
ranksum wtpv9 if round==3|round==8, by(round) porder 
 
ranksum wtpv9 if round==4|round==5, by(round) porder 
ranksum wtpv9 if round==4|round==6, by(round) porder 
ranksum wtpv9 if round==4|round==7, by(round) porder 
ranksum wtpv9 if round==4|round==8, by(round) porder 
 
ranksum wtpv9 if round==5|round==6, by(round) porder 
ranksum wtpv9 if round==5|round==7, by(round) porder 
ranksum wtpv9 if round==5|round==8, by(round) porder 
 
ranksum wtpv9 if round==6|round==7, by(round) porder 
ranksum wtpv9 if round==6|round==8, by(round) porder 
 
ranksum wtpv9 if round==7|round==8, by(round) porder 
 
*Means of baseline over #alternatives* 
ranksum wtpv7 if round==1|round==2, by(round) porder 
ranksum wtpv7 if round==1|round==3, by(round) porder 
ranksum wtpv7 if round==1|round==4, by(round) porder 
ranksum wtpv7 if round==1|round==5, by(round) porder 
ranksum wtpv7 if round==1|round==6, by(round) porder 
ranksum wtpv7 if round==1|round==7, by(round) porder 
ranksum wtpv7 if round==1|round==8, by(round) porder 
 
ranksum wtpv7 if round==2|round==3, by(round) porder 
ranksum wtpv7 if round==2|round==4, by(round) porder 
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ranksum wtpv7 if round==2|round==5, by(round) porder 
ranksum wtpv7 if round==2|round==6, by(round) porder 
ranksum wtpv7 if round==2|round==7, by(round) porder 
ranksum wtpv7 if round==2|round==8, by(round) porder 
 
ranksum wtpv7 if round==3|round==4, by(round) porder 
ranksum wtpv7 if round==3|round==5, by(round) porder 
ranksum wtpv7 if round==3|round==6, by(round) porder 
ranksum wtpv7 if round==3|round==7, by(round) porder 
ranksum wtpv7 if round==3|round==8, by(round) porder 
 
ranksum wtpv7 if round==4|round==5, by(round) porder 
ranksum wtpv7 if round==4|round==6, by(round) porder 
ranksum wtpv7 if round==4|round==7, by(round) porder 
ranksum wtpv7 if round==4|round==8, by(round) porder 
 
ranksum wtpv7 if round==5|round==6, by(round) porder 
ranksum wtpv7 if round==5|round==7, by(round) porder 
ranksum wtpv7 if round==5|round==8, by(round) porder 
 
ranksum wtpv7 if round==6|round==7, by(round) porder 
ranksum wtpv7 if round==6|round==8, by(round) porder 
 
ranksum wtpv7 if round==7|round==8, by(round) porder  
 
/*Evaluate structural changes in pooling*/ 
set more off 
tobit wtpv7 age educ2 educ3 hhsize fem married race1 race3 income wfv, ll(0) 
estat ic 
 
tobit wtpv711 age educ2 educ3 hhsize fem married race1 race3 income wfv, ll(0)  
estat ic 
 
tobit wtpv728 age educ2 educ3 hhsize fem married race1 race3 income wfv, ll(0) 
estat ic 
 
tobit wtpv712 age educ2 educ3 hhsize fem married race1 race3 income wfv, ll(0)  
estat ic 
 
tobit wtpv738 age educ2 educ3 hhsize fem married race1 race3 income wfv, ll(0)  
estat ic 
 
tobit wtpv713 age educ2 educ3 hhsize fem married race1 race3 income wfv, ll(0)  
estat ic 
 110 
 
 
tobit wtpv748 age educ2 educ3 hhsize fem married race1 race3 income wfv, ll(0)  
estat ic 
 
tobit wtpv714 age educ2 educ3 hhsize fem married race1 race3 income wfv, ll(0)  
estat ic 
 
tobit wtpv758 age educ2 educ3 hhsize fem married race1 race3 income wfv, ll(0)  
estat ic 
 
tobit wtpv715 age educ2 educ3 hhsize fem married race1 race3 income wfv, ll(0)  
estat ic 
 
tobit wtpv768 age educ2 educ3 hhsize fem married race1 race3 income wfv, ll(0)  
estat ic 
 
tobit wtpv716 age educ2 educ3 hhsize fem married race1 race3 income wfv, ll(0)  
estat ic 
 
tobit wtpv778 age educ2 educ3 hhsize fem married race1 race3 income wfv, ll(0)  
estat ic 
 
tobit wtpv717 age educ2 educ3 hhsize fem married race1 race3 income wfv, ll(0)  
estat ic 
 
tobit wtpv788 age educ2 educ3 hhsize fem married race1 race3 income wfv, ll(0)  
estat ic  
 
outsheet using "C:\Users\dchavez\Dropbox\1 
TAMU\RA\Thesis\Strawberry.Data\analysis\bdata.csv", comma replace  
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APPENDIX D 
 
NLOGIT CODE 
IMPORT;FILE=" C:\Users\dchavez\Dropbox\1 
TAMU\RA\Thesis\Strawberry.Data\analysis\bdata.csv"$ 
 
NAMELIST ; ALLX = ONE, V1, V2, V3, V4, V5, V6, V8, V9, AGE, EDUC2, EDUC3, 
HHSIZE, FEM, MARRIED, RACE1, RACE3, INCOME, WFV $ 
NAMELIST ; ALLX9 = ONE, V1, V2, V3, V4, V5, V6, V8, AGE, EDUC2, EDUC3, 
HHSIZE, FEM, MARRIED, RACE1, RACE3, INCOME, WFV $ 
NAMELIST ; NOCON = V1, V2, V3, V4, V5, V6, V8, V9, AGE, EDUC2, EDUC3, 
HHSIZE, FEM, MARRIED, RACE1, RACE3, INCOME, WFV $ 
NAMELIST ; NOCON9 = V1, V2, V3, V4, V5, V6, V8, AGE, EDUC2, EDUC3, 
HHSIZE, FEM, MARRIED, RACE1, RACE3, INCOME, WFV $ 
NAMELIST ; NOCONVAR = AGE, EDUC2, EDUC3, HHSIZE, FEM, MARRIED, 
RACE1, RACE3, INCOME, WFV $ 
NAMELIST ; NOVAR = ONE,AGE, EDUC2, EDUC3, HHSIZE, FEM, MARRIED, 
RACE1, RACE3, INCOME, WFV $ 
NAMELIST ; RPX = V1, V2, V3, V4, V5, V6, V8, V9 $ 
NAMELIST ; RPX9 = V1, V2, V3, V4, V5, V6, V8 $ 
 
SETPANEL ; Group = id ; Pds = panelid $  
 
/*Mean WTP for different alternatives*/ 
TOBIT  
; Lhs = wtpv7 
; Rhs = R1, R2, R3, R4, R5, R6, R7, R8 
; Het 
; Hfn =  round 
; Maxit = 10000 
; Partial Effects  
$ 
 
TOBIT  
; Lhs = wtpv7 
; Rhs = R1, R2, R3, R4, R5, R6, R7, R8 
; Partial Effects  
$ 
 
/*Model 1a: RPM Tobit wtpv7*/ 
TOBIT  
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; Lhs = wtpV7 
; Rhs = novar, ROUND 
; RPM  
; Fcn = round(n) 
; Panel 
; Pts = 500 
; Halton 
; MAXIT=10000 
; Partial Effects  
 $ 
 
/*Model 1b: RPM Tobit wtpv7 for 1-4 alternatives*/ 
TOBIT  
; Lhs = wtpV7_14 
; Rhs = novar, ROUND 
; RPM  
; Fcn = round(n) 
; Panel 
; Pts = 500 
; Halton 
; MAXIT=10000 
; Partial Effects  
 $ 
 
/*Model 1c: RPM Tobit wtpv7 for 5-8 alternatives*/ 
TOBIT  
; Lhs = wtpV7_58 
; Rhs = novar, ROUND 
; RPM  
; Fcn = round(n) 
; Panel 
; Pts = 500 
; Halton 
; MAXIT=10000 
; Partial Effects  
 $ 
 
/*Model 2a: Tobit wtpv7 w/het scaler*/ 
TOBIT 
; Lhs = wtpv7 
; Rhs = NOVAR 
; Het 
; Hfn =  round 
; Maxit = 10000 
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; Partial Effects  
$ 
 
/*Model 2b: Tobit wtpv7 1-4 alternatives w/het scaler*/ 
TOBIT 
; Lhs = wtpv7_14 
; Rhs = NOVAR 
; Het 
; Hfn =  round 
; Maxit = 10000 
; Partial Effects  
$ 
 
/*Model 2c: Tobit wtpv7 5-8 alternatives w/het scaler*/ 
TOBIT 
; Lhs = wtpv7_58 
; Rhs = NOVAR 
; Het 
; Hfn =  round 
; Maxit = 10000 
; Partial Effects  
$ 
 
/*Model 3a1: RPM Linear differences wtp base-duplicate 1-8 alternatives*/ 
REGRESS 
; Lhs = DDUPL 
; Rhs = ROUND, NOVAR 
; RPM 
; Fcn = ROUND(n) 
; Panel 
; Pts = 500 
; Halton 
; MAXIT=10000 
; Partial Effects  
 $ 
 
/*Model 3a2: RPM Linear differences wtp base-duplicate 1-8 alternatives NOCON*/ 
REGRESS 
; Lhs = DDUPL 
; Rhs = ROUND, NOCONVAR 
; RPM 
; Fcn = ROUND(n) 
; Panel 
; Pts = 500 
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; Halton 
; MAXIT=10000 
; Partial Effects  
 $ 
 
/*Model 3b1: RPM Linear differences wtp base-duplicate 1-4 alternatives*/ 
REGRESS 
; Lhs = DDUP14 
; Rhs = ROUND, NOVAR 
; RPM 
; Fcn = ROUND(n) 
; Panel 
; Pts = 500 
; Halton 
; MAXIT=10000 
; Partial Effects  
 $ 
 
/*Model 3b2: RPM Linear differences wtp base-duplicate 1-4 alternatives NOCON*/ 
REGRESS 
; Lhs = DDUP14 
; Rhs = ROUND, NOCONVAR 
; RPM 
; Fcn = ROUND(n) 
; Panel 
; Pts = 500 
; Halton 
; MAXIT=10000 
; Partial Effects  
 $ 
 
/*Model 3c: RPM Linear differences wtp base-duplicate 5-8 alternatives*/ 
REGRESS 
; Lhs = DDUP58 
; Rhs = ROUND, NOVAR 
; RPM 
; Fcn = ROUND(n) 
; Panel 
; Pts = 500 
; Halton 
; MAXIT=10000 
; Partial Effects  
 $ 
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/*Model 3c: RPM Linear differences wtp base-duplicate 5-8 alternatives NOCON*/ 
REGRESS 
; Lhs = DDUP58 
; Rhs = ROUND, NOCONVAR 
; RPM 
; Fcn = ROUND(n) 
; Panel 
; Pts = 500 
; Halton 
; MAXIT=10000 
; Partial Effects  
 $ 
 
/*Model 4a: RPM Linear differences wtp base-control 1-8 alternatives*/ 
REGRESS 
; Lhs = DCTRL 
; Rhs = ROUND, NOVAR 
; RPM 
; Fcn = ROUND(n) 
; Panel 
; Pts = 500 
; Halton 
; MAXIT=10000 
; Partial Effects  
 $ 
 
/*Model 4a: RPM Linear differences wtp base-control 1-8 alternatives NOCON*/ 
REGRESS 
; Lhs = DCTRL 
; Rhs = ROUND, NOCONVAR 
; RPM 
; Fcn = ROUND(n) 
; Panel 
; Pts = 500 
; Halton 
; MAXIT=10000 
; Partial Effects  
 $ 
 
/*Model 4b: RPM Linear differences wtp base-control 1-4 alternatives*/ 
REGRESS 
; Lhs = DCTR14 
; Rhs = ROUND, NOVAR 
; RPM 
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; Fcn = ROUND(n) 
; Panel 
; Pts = 500 
; Halton 
; MAXIT=10000 
; Partial Effects  
 $ 
 
/*Model 4b: RPM Linear differences wtp base-control 1-4 alternatives NOCON*/ 
REGRESS 
; Lhs = DCTR14 
; Rhs = ROUND, NOCONVAR 
; RPM 
; Fcn = ROUND(n) 
; Panel 
; Pts = 500 
; Halton 
; MAXIT=10000 
; Partial Effects  
 $ 
 
/*Model 4c: RPM Linear differences wtp base-control 5-8 alternatives*/ 
REGRESS 
; Lhs = DCTR58 
; Rhs = ROUND, NOVAR 
; RPM 
; Fcn = ROUND(n) 
; Panel 
; Pts = 500 
; Halton 
; MAXIT=10000 
; Partial Effects  
 $ 
 
/*Model 4c: RPM Linear differences wtp base-control 5-8 alternatives NOCON*/ 
REGRESS 
; Lhs = DCTR58 
; Rhs = ROUND, NOCONVAR 
; RPM 
; Fcn = ROUND(n) 
; Panel 
; Pts = 500 
; Halton 
; MAXIT=10000 
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; Partial Effects  
 $ 
 
/*Model 5a1: Heteroscedastic Linear of differences wtp base-control 1-8 alternatives*/ 
HREG 
; Lhs=DCTRL 
; Rhs=NOVAR 
; Rh2=ROUND 
; Maxit=10000 
; Partial Effects  
$ 
 
/*Model 5a2: Heteroscedastic Linear of differences wtp base-control 1-8 alternatives*/ 
HREG 
; Lhs=DCTRL 
; Rhs=NOCONVAR 
; Rh2=ROUND 
; Maxit=10000 
; Partial Effects  
$ 
 
/*Model 5b1: Heteroscedastic Linear of differences wtp base-control 1-4 alternatives*/ 
HREG 
; Lhs=DCTR14 
; Rhs=NOVAR 
; Rh2= R1, R2, R3, R4 
; Maxit=10000 
; Partial Effects  
$ 
 
/*Model 5b2: Heteroscedastic Linear of differences wtp base-control 1-4 alternatives 
NOCON*/ 
HREG 
; Lhs=DCTR14 
; Rhs=NOCONVAR 
; Rh2= R1, R2, R3, R4 
; Maxit=10000 
; Partial Effects  
$ 
 
/*Model 5c1: Heteroscedastic Linear of differences wtp base-control 5-8 alternatives*/ 
HREG 
; Lhs=DCTR58 
; Rhs=NOVAR 
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; Rh2= R5, R6, R7, R8 
; Maxit=10000 
; Partial Effects  
$ 
 
/*Model 5c2: Heteroscedastic Linear of differences wtp base-control 5-8 alternatives*/ 
HREG 
; Lhs=DCTR58 
; Rhs=NOCONVAR 
; Rh2= R5, R6, R7, R8 
; Maxit=10000 
; Partial Effects  
$ 
 
TOBIT 
; Lhs = wtpv7_1/wtpv8 
; Rhs = NOVAR 
; Het 
; Hfn =  ROUND 
; MAXIT=10000 
; Partial Effects  
 $ 
 
TOBIT  
; Lhs = wtpv9/wtpv7 
; Rhs = NOVAR 
; Het 
; Hfn =  ROUND 
; MAXIT= 10000 
; Partial Effects  
 $ 
 
